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Relational Enforcement of Stock Exchange Rules
Geeyoung Min & Kwon-Yong Jin
Stock exchanges, as regulating entities supervised by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have wielded their
rulemaking power on various corporate governance issues,
ranging from the independent board committee requirement
adopted in 2003 to the board diversity requirement approved in
2021. Simultaneously, as for-profit corporate entities, major stock
exchanges have been competing against each other to attract and
retain more companies. This dual status of stock exchanges—as
regulators and as profit-driven entities—brings into question the
stock exchanges’ incentive to enforce their own rules against listed
companies. What happens if a listed company violates stock
exchange rules?
As the first study that offers an analysis of original handcollected data on 838 enforcement actions by stock exchanges in
2019, this Article finds that (1) stock exchanges’ detection of
noncompliance is mostly on the failure to meet mechanical
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criteria, such as the $1.00 minimum stock price requirement; (2)
listed companies tend to self-report violations of corporate
governance requirements before the stock exchanges detect them;
and (3) even after noncompliance is detected, stock exchanges tend
to extend cure periods and rarely impose the only substantive
sanction for stock exchange rule violations: delisting. Focusing on
stock exchanges’ corporate governance requirements for listed
companies, our analysis of S&P 1500 companies’ board
composition data shows that most companies diligently comply
with the stock exchanges’ requirements despite this low likelihood
of detection and enforcement.
This Article argues that this curious coexistence of lax
enforcement and diligent compliance can be explained as an
extension of the relational contract theory to the relationship
between a regulator and a regulated. Competition among stock
exchanges makes a long-term, interactive relationship between
stock exchanges and their listed companies valuable to both sides.
The fact that the stock exchanges’ enforcement mechanism relies
on a single, drastic measure of terminating the relationship (i.e.,
delisting) and that listed companies’ noncompliance rarely
triggers delisting incentivize cooperative compliance between the
regulator and the regulated. Such “relational enforcement” of
stock exchange rules indicates that where there is an extended
regulatory relationship that offers a substantial benefit to the
regulated entity, diligent compliance can be expected even in the
absence of rigorous, formal policing.
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INTRODUCTION
Picture a stretch of highway with a speed limit of fifty miles per
hour. Occasionally, police are on the side of the highway to check
for speeding cars and ensure compliance with the speed limit. But
what is remarkable about this stretch of highway is how the police
act. The police rarely catch a speeding driver, and even when the
151
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police do catch a speeding driver, the officer typically lets off the
driver with a warning—no ticket; no fines.
What is even more remarkable about this highway, however, is
how the drivers act—even when they know of the police’s lenient
enforcement. Despite lax police enforcement, the likelihood of
getting caught for speeding is low. Even when caught, the
monetary penalties are nonexistent—the drivers are extremely
diligent in driving under the speed limit; it is practically impossible
to find a speeding driver. In the rare case they inadvertently drive
above the speed limit, they self-report their speeding to the police.
This Article explores this curious coexistence of lax enforcement
and rigorous compliance in one major area of American securities
regulation: regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. U.S.
stock exchanges, most notably the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and Nasdaq, set a number of rules that their listed
companies must abide by, ranging from quantitative criteria (e.g.,
minimum trading price) to disclosure (e.g., timely filing of periodic
reports) to corporate governance (e.g., majority independent board,
mandatory board committees, and board diversity).1 Particularly
for corporate governance rules, the data on stock exchange
enforcement disclosures reveals that exchanges rarely enforce their
rules, and when they enforce, the punishments are light at worst.
Yet, separate data on board composition shows that the listed
companies diligently comply with the exchanges’ corporate
governance rules, with virtually no violations among more than
one thousand companies in our sample.

1. Moreover, in more recent years, the stock exchanges have taken greater roles in
affecting the corporate governance of their listed companies; for example, with the proposal
and adoption of the board diversity requirement, Nasdaq has made a foray into diversity
composition—not just independence—of board members by requiring that Nasdaq-listed
companies disclose the gender, racial, and LGBTQ+ status of their directors and have (or
disclose/explain why it does not have) two directors who are “diverse.” Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes, as Modified by Amendments No. 1, to Adopt Listing Rules Related
to Board Diversity and to Offer Certain Listed Companies Access to a Complimentary Board
Recruiting Service, Exchange Act Release No. 34-92590 (Aug. 6, 2021); Nasdaq Stock Market,
Nasdaq’s Board Diversity Rule: What Nasdaq-Listed Companies Should Know (Aug. 17, 2021),
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/Board%20Diversity%20Disclosure%20Five%20Th
ings.pdf. Similarly, in the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, both Nasdaq and the NYSE
relaxed their rules on shareholder approval for equity issuances. Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-88572 (Apr.
6, 2020); Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-88805 (May 4, 2020).
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A complicating factor in this puzzle is the dual status of the
stock exchanges in the United States. As a regulating entity
designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on
the one hand, they act as regulators and enforcers, setting rules for
their listed companies and enforcing them.2 On the other hand, as
a corporate entity, they are publicly traded for-profit corporations3
in a competitive market for more listed companies.4 This Article
examines how the stock exchanges’ for-profit corporate entity
status, combined with competition between the exchanges, affects
the exchanges’ regulatory enforcement, and in turn, influences the
listed companies’ compliance.
The dual status of stock exchanges creates a balance of push-pull
factors for stock exchange rule enforcement.5 At first glance, as
asserted by critics of industry self-regulation, the stock exchanges’
pursuit of profits and the presence of a competitor can potentially
lead to lax enforcement, as they may lower their standards to attract
2. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997); A.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities
Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 977 (1999) [hereinafter Pritchard, Markets as Monitors];
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 2359, 2399–2401 (1998); Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REGUL.
(Spring 2003), at 32, 33–34 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets].
3. Nasdaq began trading on its own platform in 2005 after a spin-off from National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and NYSE became a publicly traded company the
following year through a merger with Archipelago Holdings. See Jerry Knight, Stock Markets
on the Open Market: Exchanges Go Public, Generate Windfalls, WASH. POST. (Feb. 20, 2006),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2006/02/20/stock-markets-on-theopen-market-exchanges-go-public-generate-windfalls/41e4af29-66a0-4446-92a4-147f11e97fb1.
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., a for-profit publicly traded company, acquired NYSE in
2013.
4. See John McCrank, U.S. Stock Exchange Competition to Heat Up in 2020 with
New Entrants, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-exchanges/u-s-stock-exchange-competition-to-heat-up-in-2020-with-new-entrantsidUSKBN1W42Y6 (“There are currently 13 U.S. stock exchanges, 12 of which are run by
Intercontinental Exchange Inc.’s NYSE, Nasdaq Inc., and Cboe Global Markets Group runs
the only independent exchange.”). As of July 23, 2020, there are twenty-four U.S. stock
exchanges registered with the SEC under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See National Securities Exchanges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
5. The stock exchanges recognize the difficulties in balancing the conflicting
obligations as a dual status entity as a risk factor. See Intercontinental Exch., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 28 (Feb. 6, 2020) (“The for-profit exchanges’ goal of maximizing stockholder
value might contradict the exchanges’ regulatory and self-regulatory responsibilities.”);
Nasdaq, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 25, 2020) (“We have self-regulatory obligations
and also operate for-profit business, and these two roles may create conflicts of interest).
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more issuers.6 Simultaneously, such collusion concerns may be
counterbalanced by the exchanges’ reputational concerns and the
SEC oversight.7 Relaxing their enforcement level too much risks
destroying the reputational capital of the major exchanges, and
conspicuous collusion may also invite SEC intervention.
Furthermore, the fact that enforcement options available to
exchanges are practically all or nothing makes the stock exchanges’
enforcement not a viable option against most of the violations.8
Given this background, this Article explores the following
questions. What happens if a listed company violates stock
exchange rules?9 If stock exchanges do not enforce their rules
rigorously, how well do listed companies comply with the rules? Is
it desirable for stock exchanges to enforce the rules and delist
companies proactively?
The existing literature on stock exchange rules largely falls into
two categories: theoretical examinations of stock exchanges’
incentive structure and how such incentive structure affects their
6. See Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 975 (2012).
7. See Nasdaq, supra note 5, at 21 (“We . . . bear regulatory responsibility related to
our listed companies and our markets. Any failure by us to diligently and fairly regulate our
markets or to otherwise fulfill our regulatory obligations could significantly harm our
reputation, prompt SEC scrutiny and adversely affect our business and reputation.”). It is
worth noting that the SEC does sometimes encourage “collusion” between exchanges by
encouraging them to adopt similar rules, but such “collusion” is more closely characterized
as “coordination.” What we refer to as “collusion” (in the problematic sense) is between the
exchange and the listed issuer. See Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 2, at 977–78.
8. For both NYSE and Nasdaq, the only formal sanction available against a
noncompliant company is a delisting, or a suspension as a pre-stage of the delisting. See infra
Section I.B.2.
9. A recent legal memorandum highlights the possibility that a listed company
may analyze the costs and benefits of violating stock exchange rules, taking into account
the probability of detection and severity of sanctions, and decide that violation is justified.
See Victor Lewkow, Christopher E. Austin & Paul M. Tiger, CBS-NAI Dispute, Part III:
Can Stockholders Rely on Stock Exchange Rules to Prevent Dilution of Their Voting and
Economic Interests?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 24, 2018), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/24/cbs-nai-dispute-part-iii-can-stockholders-rely-onstock-exchange-rules-to-prevent-dilution-of-their-voting-and-economic-interests/
(“[S]tockholders of an NYSE-listed (or NASDAQ-listed) company should not blindly assume
that an issuer will comply with the applicable exchange’s rules in every situation. There may
be instances where directors of a board are willing to bear the risk of delisting—and in fact,
feel justified (rightly or wrongly) in doing so—to achieve some other aim that they believe is
paramount.”). For companies’ deviation from the law and regulations for the valueenhancing innovations, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019);
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013 (2019).
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regulatory and supervisory capacity or willingness;10 and empirical
studies of voluntary and/or involuntary delistings and their
effects.11 The former generally does not address how such
incentives actually shape stock exchange enforcement, and the
latter largely focuses on the aftereffects of corporate delisting
instead of the factors that lead to the delisting decision by the stock
exchanges. To bridge that gap, we examine firm-level data on
enforcement of and compliance with stock exchange rules in the
United States, focusing on disclosures made in 2019. In addition,
we complement our data with practitioner interviews regarding
their perception of stock exchange enforcement efforts. Pairing the
enforcement disclosure data with the practitioner interviews
provides both quantitative and qualitative pictures of stock
exchange rule enforcement patterns.
The Article’s contributions to literature are fourfold. First, we
present a comprehensive examination of the enforcement pattern
of stock exchange rules. Given that rules without enforcement are
mere guidelines, understanding the enforcement of stock exchange
rules is just as important as understanding the structure of the rules
themselves. Based on Form 8-K disclosures filed by issuers that
have been subject to exchange sanctions and industry interviews,
we show that stock exchange enforcement strategy largely relies on
conversation and negotiation with issuers to remedy violations
instead of formal enforcement actions, and delisting is rare. While
the formal sanctions available to exchanges are limited to delisting,
the exchanges have created a de facto informal system of sanctions
by relying more heavily on negotiations and conversations to
achieve their goal of remedying noncompliance.
Second, as a flipside to enforcement, focusing on corporate
governance listing standards, we also present an overview of the
status quo of stock exchange rule compliance. Contrary to our
prediction—that the rate of compliance would be low given that
10. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 2; Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock ExchangeBased Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1518 (1997); Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra
note 2; Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, supra note 2, at 32; Chris Brummer, Stock
Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008).
11. See Jonathan Macey, Maureen O’Hara & David Pompilio, Down and Out in the Stock
Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683 (2008); Jeffrey H.
Harris, Venkatesh Panchapagesan & Ingrid M. Werner, Off But Not Gone: A Study of Nasdaq
Delistings (Ohio State Univ. Fisher Coll. Of Bus. Working Paper No. 2008-03-005, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=628203.
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there is no substantial risk of delisting for noncompliance—a
separate dataset on S&P 1500 companies’ board composition shows
that listed companies comply and voluntarily report their violations,
if any, to the exchanges. Particularly, for corporate governance
violations, the delisting sanction is rarely, if ever, imposed, so the
repercussions for noncompliance are minor at best, but violations are
rare. Given that stock exchanges detect noncompliance mostly based
on listed companies’ self-reporting and, more importantly, rarely
delist companies based on noncompliance with the corporate
governance requirements, this indicates a puzzling mix of lax
enforcement and rigorous compliance.
Third, we draw upon the relational contract literature to
examine and understand the enforcement and compliance pattern
found in stock exchange rules. When we view stock exchange
regulation as a “relational” contract, the ostensibly lax enforcement
strategy nonetheless can be effective as long as there is a threat of
termination of a relationship, i.e., delisting, based on issuer
noncompliance. On the flip side, even if current enforcement is lax,
listed companies’ strong compliance with the exchange rules can be
explained as signaling the issuer’s future value to the exchange,
discouraging the exchange from terminating the relationship
should the listed company’s violations become more serious; in a
way, past compliance can be seen as insurance against future
delisting. Returning to the highway analogy above, when the same
police officer is on the highway day after day, and the drivers form
a relationship with that officer, the drivers would be inclined to
remain on the officer’s good side, lest they need the officer’s
leniency later.
Lastly, we note a number of complexities and departures from
the traditional relational contract model, including the potential
divergence of the exchanges’ private incentives with their public
role and the conflict between present and future shareholders in
delisting decisions. These complexities introduce another layer of
interested groups—most notably, the current shareholders and the
public investors—that can influence the decisions of stock
exchanges. Taken together, this Article sheds light on the unique
dynamics of enforcement and compliance in a repeated game (a
relational model).
Our research is particularly timely in today’s securities
regulation environment, given the expanding role of stock
156
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exchanges in the corporate governance landscape.12 In the
aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, stock exchange
rules were amended to impose a number of corporate governance
requirements to strengthen internal controls, such as an executive
compensation committee and a nominating/governance
committee comprised entirely of independent directors (or a close
substitute of such requirement). In 2020, with the increasing focus
on boardroom diversity, Nasdaq proposed a rule amendment that
would mandate at least two diverse directors and public disclosure
of a board diversity score, which was finally adopted in 2021 after
SEC approval.13 These initiatives by stock exchanges would have
no teeth without enforcement and compliance, making our
research questions particularly relevant.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the legal
framework governing securities exchanges, both as regulating entities
and for-profit corporate entities, and the peculiarities of regulation by
stock exchanges, including how the stock exchange regulation differs
from other securities regulation. Part II examines the enforcement and
compliance landscape of stock exchange rules and presents relevant
data. Part III explains this enforcement and compliance landscape
based on the characterization of stock exchange regulation as a
relational contract, followed by the conclusion.14

12. See, e.g., Hans Christiansen & Alissa Koldertsova, The Role of Stock Exchanges in
Corporate Governance 4 (OECD Fin. Mkt. Trends, Working Paper No. 2009/1, 2008) (“[S]tock
exchanges have often enlarged their regulatory role to embrace a wider palette of corporate
governance concerns. They have contributed to the development of corporate governance
recommendations and encouraged their application to listed companies.”); Amir N. Licht,
Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41
VA. J. INT’L L. 583, 626 (2001) (“The stiffening competition among stock exchanges, however,
may help change this situation by imposing corporate governance requirements as part of
their listing conditions, thereby creating corporate governance regimes that are disconnected
from particular national laws.”).
13. See supra note 1.
14. A stock exchange can act as a regulator of both its broker-dealer members and its
listed companies. In this Article, our focus is exclusively on the stock exchange’s regulation
of its listed companies.
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I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING STOCK EXCHANGE
RULE ENFORCEMENT
A. Dual Status of Stock Exchanges
National securities exchanges in the United States, by virtue
of their corporate and regulatory structure, embody multiple
characteristics at once. As a regulating entity, they are
self-regulatory organizations governing their broker-dealer
members and standard-setters for their listed companies. As a
corporate entity, they are for-profit business organizations, with
commensurate fiduciary obligations to their shareholders. As a
regulated entity, they are subject to the SEC’s oversight as national
securities exchanges. This Part I thus lays out the multiple legal
frameworks governing securities exchanges and how they affect
the securities exchanges’ regulatory role.
1. Exchanges as a regulating entity
a. Exchanges’ delegated authority. As noted above, pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act (hereinafter “Exchange Act”), the
national securities exchanges act as—and are required to act as—
regulators of their broker-dealer members. In furtherance of this
mandate, the exchanges have adopted a number of rules governing
their broker-dealer members including those relating to
organizational qualifications, communications with the public, and
trading conduct. Exchanges can impose a number of sanctions on
violating broker-dealer members, including censure, monetary
fine, cease-and-desist order, suspension, and expulsion.15 In fact, in
sanctioning a member (including associated persons), both the
NYSE and Nasdaq have incredibly wide latitude—even if a
sanction does not fall under the enumerated list above, both
exchanges can impose “any other fitting sanction.”16
In addition to their role as a regulator of broker-dealer
members, securities exchanges also serve as regulators of their
15. NYSE Rule 8310 (2020); Nasdaq Stock Market Rule 8310 (2020).
16. NYSE Rule 8310(a)(7) (2020); Nasdaq Stock Market Rule 8310(a)(7) (2020). It is
worth noting that the stock exchanges’ authority to levy sanctions on their members is not
unlimited. If the SEC finds that the sanction “imposes any burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act] or is excessive
or oppressive,” the SEC may set aside or reduce such sanction. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(2) (2018).
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listed companies through their listing standards. Originating as
marketing devices to attract investors,17 and/or a way to earn
exemption from state blue sky laws,18 listing standards straddle the
boundary between contractual obligations and public law
regulations. In the early days of securities exchanges, the listing
standards began as obligations pursuant to listing agreements
between the exchanges and the listing issuers. But with the
amendment of the Exchange Act in 1975, the SEC’s new authority
to approve or disapprove exchange rules (or even add, amend, or
delete rules itself) brought the listing standards within the purview
of the SEC’s oversight.19 Historically, the SEC has relied more on its
Section 19(b) authority to approve or disapprove rule amendments
proposed by exchanges (rather than adding new rules itself
pursuant to its Section 19(c) authority), likely because exchanges
have more flexibility in adopting rules (and having them approved
by the SEC) than the SEC has in adopting exchange rules itself.20
17. Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. L. 1461, 1462 (1991).
18. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU
L. REV. 325, 332 (2001).
19. While most of the Exchange Act’s provisions concerning national securities
exchanges focus on exchanges’ regulation of their broker-dealer members, rules applicable
to listed companies are nonetheless exchange rules subject to Section 19 of the Exchange Act
and the corresponding SEC oversight and approval.
20. This difference in scope was clearly demonstrated in the adoption and subsequent
invalidation of SEC’s Rule 19c-4. In 1988, pursuant to its Section 19(c) authority, the SEC
adopted Rule 19c-4 barring national securities exchanges from listing shares of issuers that
violate the one-share, one-vote principle. However, the rule was invalidated by the D.C.
Circuit, which held that the rule is not “in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.”
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit noted that when exchanges regulate listed companies by threat
of delisting, they are not relying on any governmental authority and thus have greater
flexibility in adopting rules governing listed companies. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The government regulatory authority conferred by the
[Exchange Act] is an exchange’s power to expel, fine, bar from associating with members,
and otherwise sanction ‘its members and persons associated with its members.’ . . . Of course
an exchange may delist an issuer and thus in some sense ‘enforce’ its listing standards, but
it still does not exercise any governmental authority to ‘regulate’ the issuer. Thus Congress
appears to have contemplated exchanges’ taking (1) some measures that regulate members
with delegated governmental authority and that are required to be, at a minimum, related to
the purposes of the [Exchange Act], and (2) others, that do not regulate members and do not
rely on government regulatory authority, for which there is no such requirement. As we read
the [Exchange Act], both categories are subject to Commission review under § 19(b) and to
amendment under § 19(c), but for some rules in the second category—those which do not
regulate members and are not related to the purposes of the Act—the Commission’s § 19
powers will be quite limited.”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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For example, when the SEC sought to adopt audit committee
requirements for listed companies, it “suggested” the
requirement’s adoption to the NYSE, which in turn proposed the
rule and adopted it with the SEC’s blessing.21 Therefore, listing
standards can be considered private law obligations subject to the
SEC’s oversight, but whether they draw on governmental
regulatory authority in their enforcement is debatable.
Currently, the NYSE and Nasdaq’s listing standards can be
broadly classified into three categories. First, there are
quantitative—or technical—standards. These include minimum
criteria for distribution of shares, market capitalization, and per
share price. In particular, minimum market capitalization and
minimum per share price are often limiting criteria for financially
troubled issuers that see their share price (and therefore the market
capitalization) plummet as a result of the financial distress. While
some quantitative standards may be defensible to ensure a liquid
trading market (e.g., distribution of shares), price-based
requirements have also come under criticism for their arbitrariness.
The second set of standards include disclosure-related
requirements. Listed companies are required to provide periodic
financial information to their shareholders, disclose material
information promptly to the public, and provide advance notice to
the exchange of certain information.22 Given the federal securities
laws’ focus on disclosure of accurate material information, these
disclosure-related standards overlap with the requirements of
federal securities laws to a substantial degree. Since federal securities
laws already impose penalties for failure to disclose material
information in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations,
the penalties imposed by the stock exchanges for violation of
disclosure-related requirements play a supplemental role.
Lastly, there are corporate governance standards. These include
the requirement that listed companies’ boards of directors have a
majority of independent directors, the requirement that listed
companies have a nominating/corporate governance committee,
21. Karmel, supra note 18, at 340. During this rule proposal process, the stock
exchanges typically submit the draft rule proposal to the SEC for comments and incorporate
those comments before filing the proposal officially. Thus, the SEC can de facto shape the
stock exchange rules through the 19(b) process.
22. NYSE Listed Company Manual §§ 202–04 (2020); Nasdaq Stock Market Rule 5250
(2020) [hereinafter Nasdaq Rules].
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compensation committee, and audit committee—in each case
composed entirely of independent directors —and the requirement
that shareholder approval be obtained for certain transactions (e.g.,
issuance of common stock with voting power equal to or in excess
of 20% of voting power currently outstanding).23 Since these
provisions govern the internal corporate affairs of issuers, some of
these requirements overlap with the provisions of state corporate
law—such as the annual shareholder meeting requirement—but
others are standalone requirements, essentially creating a corporate
law system independent of state corporate law.
Although many of these standards are rooted neither in the
federal regulatory powers nor in the state corporate law, their
practical importance cannot be overemphasized. Quantitative
listing standards, such as the minimum per share price, drive a
number of corporate actions like reverse stock splits. Many
corporate governance standards set the norm for listed companies,
including a majority independent board, and shape the manner in
which corporate transactions are implemented. For example,
the shareholder approval requirement for issuance of common
stock with a voting power of 20% or more effectively creates an
acquirer-side vote requirement for stock acquisitions. As such, the
enforcement of these listing standards should be considered no less
important than enforcement of federal securities laws or of state
corporate law.
b. SEC’s supervision. Among other things, the Exchange Act
has set up a regulatory system of stock exchanges whereby the SEC
monitors and regulates (and imposes certain obligations upon)
stock exchanges, and the stock exchanges, in turn, regulate their
members and listed companies.24 Under Section 5 of the Exchange
Act, brokers, dealers, and exchanges are prohibited from transacting
in securities unless such exchange is registered as a “national securities
exchange” (or is granted an exemption by the SEC), and Section 6 of
the Exchange Act sets up the registration system for such national
securities exchanges.25 Under the statute, the SEC may not approve
registration for national securities exchange status unless it makes a

23. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 312.03; Nasdaq Rule 5635(a).
24. See Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 274, 278 (2020).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78f (2018).
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number of findings.26 Most notably, the SEC must find that the
exchange is capable of complying with the Exchange Act (including
rules under the Exchange Act) and the exchange’s own rules, and
that the exchange is capable of enforcing similar compliance of the
Exchange Act and the exchange’s rules by its members. In addition, the
SEC must also find, among other things, that the exchange’s rules
are designed to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices” and “to promote just and equitable principles of trade”
and that they provide for appropriate discipline of
violating members.27
After registration of an exchange as a national securities
exchange, the SEC has a further role in regulating the exchanges’
rules and their enforcement. Before the adoption, change, addition,
or deletion of any exchange rule, the exchange must submit such
proposed rule (including deletions thereto) to the SEC for
approval.28 After public comment and hearing (in certain cases), the
SEC is to approve such rule if and only if such proposed rule is
consistent with the requirements of [the Exchange Act] and the
rules applicable to such exchange.29 Furthermore, in addition to this
power to review proposed rules, the SEC has the power to abrogate,
add to, or delete from the rules of an exchange,30 review member
disciplinary actions,31 and censure, suspend, or deregister an
exchange for failure to comply with the Exchange Act or for failure
to enforce member compliance therewith.32 Thus, the initial
registration and subsequent regulation of national securities
exchanges require that such exchanges serve a dual role as
regulated entities and regulating entities.
When the stock exchanges impose sanctions on their members
or on their issuers, the sanctions are subject to SEC review and
supervision as well. Disciplinary sanctions imposed by stock

26. It is worth noting that while Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act sets forth the
substantive requirements for registration of a national securities exchange, Section 19(a) sets
forth the procedural requirements.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b).
28. Strictly speaking, this requirement applies to all self-regulatory organizations, but
as our focus is on the national securities exchanges, we focus on exchange rules here.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C).
30. Id. § 78s(c).
31. Id. § 78s(d).
32. Id. § 78s(h).
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exchanges on their members can be appealed to the SEC, where it
is reviewed under an “unnecessary or inappropriate burden on
competition” or “excessive or oppressive” standard; if the SEC
finds either criterion is satisfied, then the SEC can cancel or reduce
the sanction.33 For sanctions that involve the denial of membership
or of service—e.g., expulsion for a member, delisting for an issuer—
the SEC can review the sanction upon penalized entity’s appeal.
Upon such appeal, the SEC is to uphold the sanction if it finds that
(1) the facts forming the basis for the sanction exist, (2) the sanction
is in accordance with the rules of the exchange, and (3) such rules
were applied in a manner consistent with the purposes of the
Exchange Act;34 in practice, this means that the appeal is rarely, if
ever, successful.
2. Exchanges as a corporate entity
The two dominant securities exchanges in the United States both
underwent a series of corporate structure changes in recent years.
Starting with the Buttonwood Agreement in 1792, through which
twenty-four brokers began organized securities trading in New
York, for more than two centuries the NYSE had been a nonprofit
organization with its broker-dealers as members.35 In fact, this
mutual organization model was the norm for securities exchanges
around the world as late as the 1990s.36 Under the mutual association
model, the exchanges were owned by the broker-dealers who traded
securities on the exchange. Membership carried with it the privilege
of trading on the exchange, and members also shared in the profits
of the exchange.37 Reflecting their partially public character,
33. Id. § 78s(e)(2).
34. Id.
35. Stephen F. Diamond & Jennifer W. Kuan, Ringing on the Bell on the NYSE: Might a
Nonprofit Stock Exchange Have Been Efficient?, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2007).
36. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1800 (2002)
(“Historically, securities exchanges in the U.S. and generally elsewhere have operated as
non-profit mutual or membership organizations. . . . The first exchange to demutualized was
the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993.”); Licht, supra note 12, at 589.
37. Coffee, supra note 36, at 1801. (“With demutualization comes a more specified
governance structure in which the interests of the new shareholders are likely to dominate
over those of the constituent groups within the exchange who formerly exercised veto
power. Shareholders in turn will predictably wish to maximize the share value of their

163

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

however, their governance did reflect some public involvement. For
example, until 2003, one-half of NYSE’s directors were public
directors and the other half were directors associated with and
representing the NYSE’s industry members.38
As a result of increasing pressures on the existing dominant
exchanges to adopt new technologies and the attendant need
for capital—as well as a number of other factors, including
intra-membership conflict in decision-making—a number of
exchanges have demutualized and transformed into for-profit
corporations in recent years.39 The NYSE, being no exception, was
demutualized in 2006 as part of its merger with electronic trading
platform operator Archipelago Holdings, forming the NYSE
Group, a Delaware for-profit corporation, and listed itself on the
NYSE. Subsequently, the NYSE Group merged with Euronext
in 2007 to form NYSE Euronext, which was in turn acquired by
Intercontinental Exchange in 2013. As a result, the NYSE now exists
as a for-profit subsidiary of Intercontinental Exchange, a
publicly-traded Delaware corporation. Given this corporate
structure, the NYSE is indirectly subject to the obligations that come
with being a publicly-traded corporation, including periodic
reporting (on a consolidated basis with the Intercontinental
Exchange’s other subsidiaries) and maximization of shareholder
value.40
The Nasdaq followed a similar, albeit slightly different, path
to its current status as a publicly-traded for-profit corporation.
It originally began in 1971 as a quotation system operated by the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), a self-regulatory
organization of broker-dealer firms and registered brokers. As such,

investment . . . .”); Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 369 (2002).
38. Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of
Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 386 (2007).
39. The first exchange to demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993. It
was followed by Borsa Italiana in 1997, Australian Stock Exchange in 1998, Singapore Stock
Exchange in 1999, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse,
and Nasdaq in 2000, and the NYSE in 2006. These are only examples of many more exchanges
that have demutualized in the past quarter century. See FRANCIS A. LEES, FINANCIAL
EXCHANGES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 30 (2012).
40. Whether maximization of shareholder value should be the be-all and end-all of
corporate purpose has been subject to significant debate, and we make no normative
judgment, as it is outside the scope of this Article.

164

165

Stock Exchange Rules

during its initial years, NASD’s nonprofit, member association
corporate governance structure also governed Nasdaq.41
During the wave of exchange demutualization in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, Nasdaq, like the NYSE, also underwent a change
in corporate form. In 2000, the NASD spun off Nasdaq as a separate
Delaware for-profit corporation (along with registering it as a
national securities exchange), and Nasdaq began trading on the
OTC market in 2002 and on Nasdaq itself in 2005. Following a
number of acquisitions, including Scandinavian exchange operator
OMX, Nasdaq, Inc. is now the publicly traded Delaware holding
company of a number of exchange operators, including Nasdaq
Stock Market LLC, which operates the Nasdaq exchange. Thus, just
like the NYSE, Nasdaq’s operator is subject to the various
obligations and pressures that accompany its status as a publicly
traded corporation.
B. Peculiarities of Stock Exchange Enforcement
Partly as a result of the legal framework governing them, stock
exchange regulation is characterized by a number of peculiarities
that are in contrast to regulation by the SEC or regulation by other
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), including the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). In particular, these
characteristics significantly affect the incentive structures for stock
exchanges in enforcing their regulations governing issuer conduct
and governance.
1. Competitive stock exchange market
Stock exchanges’ regulatory framework faces an issue
well-known in the regulatory world: regulatory competition and
arbitrage. Particularly in the United States, the oligopolistic nature
of the stock exchange industry—as opposed to monopolistic—
makes regulatory competition a more probable outcome, since

41. In fact, because it was owned and operated by NASD, a self-regulatory
organization, it was not even required to register as a national securities exchange until it
was spun off. See The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Application for
Registration as a National Securities Exchange Under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44396 (June 7, 2001) (“Nasdaq currently is exempt
from the definition of ‘exchange’ under Rule 3a1-1 because it is operated by the NASD.”).
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issuers can transfer their listing domestically. An unsatisfied issuer
can move from the NYSE to Nasdaq and vice versa.
The competitive nature of the stock exchange regulatory
scheme is further compounded by the fact that the exchanges
themselves are publicly traded companies answerable to their
shareholders. Regulatory arbitrage is not a welcome phenomenon
for any regulatory body, but for stock exchanges, regulatory
arbitrage—and subsequent decrease in the number of listed
companies—has a direct, negative impact on their revenue and
profit. Thus, the increasing incidence of regulatory arbitrage can be
particularly sensitive for stock exchanges.
At the same time, to assume that this competitive dynamic
would lead to a race to the bottom, in which exchanges increasingly
turn a blind eye to violations lest listed companies leave for other
exchanges, would be too strong, as there are a number of
countervailing factors. For one, the exchanges themselves are
subject to SEC oversight, and persistent failure to enforce their
regulations may lead to SEC sanctions.42 Even in the absence of
specific SEC sanctions, the persistent failure of stock exchanges to
enforce their rules may result in calls for regulatory reform (and
potential re-shoring of regulatory authority to the SEC).43
Moreover, reputational concerns can temper this potential race
to the bottom. The two major exchanges in the United States enjoy
a substantial premium precisely because they have reputational
capital they can offer to listed companies.44 This reputational
capital, in turn, is based on the perception that the major exchanges
offer a gold standard of quality and that securities listed on those
exchanges meet such quality standards. Persistent failure to enforce
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g), (h) (2018); Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 2,
at 977. It is worth noting, however, that the statutory language only notes failure to enforce
compliance “by [a stock exchange’s] members and persons associated with its members[.]”
15 U.S.C. § 78s(g). This narrow language may mean that the SEC does not have express
oversight authority over exchanges’ persistent failure to enforce their own rules against
issuers (as opposed to members), but such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
43. Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild & Harold D. Fletcher, The NYSE Response to Specialist
Misconduct: An Example of the Failure of Self-Regulation, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 102, 128 (2010).
44. See Coffee, supra note 36, at 1828 (The NYSE “recognized that to develop a
‘reputational brand,’ it had to exclude those unwilling or unable to comply with its high
quality standards.”); id. at 1829 (“[O]nly those markets that have developed such a brand
name have developed into major international market centers with deep liquidity.”); Robert
Battalio, Andrew Ellul & Robert Jennings, Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock
Exchange, 62 J. FIN. 1243 (2007).
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their regulations can erode this reputational capital, and the
premium that investors place on NYSE or Nasdaq-listed
companies.45 In the short run, this loss of reputational capital can
lead to lower trading volume (as some investors drop out), and in
the longer run, this loss of prestige associated with listing on NYSE
or Nasdaq can lead to lower demand for exchange listing, as private
companies see a lower benefit to listing (as opposed to remaining a
private company).
Thus, the fact that stock exchanges are dual status entities—
(1) private, profit-seeking entities in a competitive market and
(2) regulator of the listed companies—creates a balance of
countervailing factors. At first glance, their pursuit of profits and
the presence of a competitor can lead to lax enforcement but may
be counterbalanced by reputational concerns and SEC oversight.
In later sections, we will empirically address the actual status of
their enforcement patterns and how this competitive market shapes
such enforcement patterns.
2. Limited enforcement option
Both the SEC and FINRA are authorized to levy a wide range
of sanctions on industry participants and/or issuers that are in
violation of their respective regulations. For instance, for violations
of the Exchange Act or rules thereunder (including those of the
self-regulatory organizations), the SEC is expressly authorized to

45. Professor Marcel Kahan does note that exchanges may seek to “protect” their
reputational capital not by enforcement but by forbearance, because conveying an image that
no violation has occurred (as opposed to actively enforcing their regulations and conveying
an image that numerous violations have occurred on the exchanges) is more beneficial to
their reputation. Kahan, supra note 10, at 1518 (“From the perspective of an exchange, the
optimal image to convey to the public is that no violations of its rules occur, an image that is
blunted by the discovery of violations, even if the violator is found and punished.”). In
response, Professor Adam C. Pritchard noted that it would be difficult to suppress such
evidence of wrongdoing and that SEC oversight of exchange enforcement can mitigate such
“head in the sand” concerns. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 2, at 980. We also note
that this “head in the sand” approach may not pass the cost-benefit test from the perspective
of the exchanges, because potential loss of reputation is not a linear function of number of
and degree of disclosed violations. Instead, loss of reputation is affected disproportionately
by disclosure of major violations and scandals; disclosure of one major scandal can do more
damage to an exchange’s reputation than disclosure of a hundred minor violations, as seen
in the uproar in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. Thus, from the perspective of an
exchange, turning a blind eye to potential red flags to convey an image that no violation of
its rules has occurred is a ticking time bomb.
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sue for injunctive relief, civil penalties, or other equitable relief, to
institute a cease-and-desist order, and/or to impose collateral
bars.46 In addition, for violations of the rules against manipulative
and deceptive devices, the SEC’s authority—through a court
proceeding—extends to prohibiting a violator from serving as a
director or officer of a public company.47 Likewise, FINRA’s
authority to levy sanctions includes censure, fine, suspension,
expulsion, cease-and-desist order, and/or “any other fitting
sanction.”48 Thus, in response to violations of their rules, the SEC
and FINRA can take a graduated approach, levying appropriate
sanctions based on the nature and severity of the violation.
In contrast, NYSE and Nasdaq’s enforcement options against
noncompliant issuers are relatively limited.49 For example, under
its regulations governing issuer noncompliance, NYSE is
authorized to suspend or delist securities of a company that falls
below its quantitative or qualitative listing standards.50 However,
suspension and/or delisting are draconian sanctions, particularly
for minor violations of the listing standards; they are akin to
imposing a death sentence for any criminal infractions, however
minor. Furthermore, while exchange listing standards are designed
to protect market participants—including public shareholders—it
is precisely those public shareholders who are hurt the most by
suspension and/or delisting of securities of issuers that violate
exchange listing standards.
Recognizing this limitation, the NYSE Listed Company Manual
also authorizes the exchange to issue public reprimand letters to
listed companies that violate its listing standards, and under SEC
regulations, these public reprimand letters would have to be
disclosed by the issuer as well (in a Form 8-K), but aside from this
option, which relies entirely on public shaming to be effective,
the NYSE Listed Company Manual does not expressly authorize

46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78u-3, 78o(b)(6). Criminal penalties are also authorized. Id. § 78ff.
47. Id. § 78u(d)(2).
48. 8310 Sanction for Violation of the Rules, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/8310 (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
49. NYSE’s enforcement options against broker-dealer members are similar to
FINRA’s and are quite flexible.
50. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 801.00 et seq.
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any other form of intermediate sanctions.51 Thus, in enforcing
their regulations applicable to issuers, the exchanges are left
with only three options: forbearance, public reprimand, or
suspension/delisting. To the extent that there is a big jump in
severity from a public reprimand to suspension/delisting, when the
appropriate sanction falls in the intermediate zone, this dearth of
options can sway the exchanges in favor of less severe sanctions.52
In addition to potentially swaying exchanges in favor of
forbearance, the fact that enforcement options available to
exchanges are essentially binary makes the appropriate timing of
sanctions against issuers difficult to ascertain. Take, for example,
the recent case of the Chinese coffee chain Luckin Coffee, Inc.,
which was embroiled in a fraudulent accounting scandal after it
was revealed in early April 2020 that it had fabricated around $310
million in sales.53 Five days after this revelation, Nasdaq suspended
trading (which suspension lasted until mid-May) in Luckin’s stock
pending request for additional information from the company.54 Six
weeks later, on May 19, Nasdaq began delisting procedure for the
company’s stock, citing “public interest concerns as raised by the
fabricated transactions” and “[Luckin’s] past failure to publicly
disclose material information.”55 When the news of the delisting
notice broke and trading resumed, investors rushed to the exit,
further triggering a collapse in the company’s stock price.56

51. Id. § 303A.13. (“Suspending trading in or delisting a listed company can be
harmful to the very shareholders that the NYSE listing standards seek to protect; the NYSE
must therefore use these measures sparingly and judiciously.”).
52. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 36 (1992).
53. Press Release, Luckin Coffee, Luckin Coffee Announces Formation of Independent
Special Committee and Provides Certain Information Related to Ongoing Internal
Investigation (Apr. 2, 2020), http://investor.luckincoffee.com/news-releases/news-releasedetails/luckin-coffee-announces-formation-independent-special-committee.
54. Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Nasdaq Halts Luckin Coffee Inc. (Apr. 9,
2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-halts-luckin-coffee-inc.-2020-04-09.
55. Press Release, Luckin Coffee, Luckin Coffee Receives Delisting Notice from
Nasdaq and Plans to Request Hearing (May 19, 2020), http://investor.luckincoffee.com
/news-releases/news-release-details/luckin-coffee-receives-delisting-notice-nasdaq-andplans-request.
56. Luckin Stock Faces Wipeout in Rush to Sell Before Delisting, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-20/luckin-s-stock-faces-wipeout-inrush-to-sell-before-delisting.
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Such a situation raises a troubling dilemma for the exchange’s
regulatory team charged with maintaining the integrity of the
trading system and protecting investors. Particularly when the
depth of and/or repercussions from an issuer’s violation is
uncertain, delisting a security too early can risk imposing a
premature death penalty on the company’s financing and severely
penalize the very investors that the exchanges should protect. On
the other hand, waiting for all the details regarding the depth of
and/or repercussions from an issuer’s violation to emerge and
delisting the violator’s security too late risks creating additional
victims of an issuer’s wrongdoing.
3. Lack of a private right of action
The ability of private investors—either individually or (more
commonly) as a class—to pursue legal action against violators of
securities laws and recover damages independently of public
enforcement is a key defining feature of American securities
regulation. Each year, over 400 securities class actions are filed in
federal courts, and even excluding lawsuits (that have recently
become very common) related to mergers and acquisitions, over 200
federal securities class actions are filed every year.57 While the SEC
and the Justice Department, for a number of reasons (including
resource constraints), cannot investigate and pursue every violation
of federal securities laws, the private securities bar has played a
significant supplemental role in enforcing securities regulations, and
the importance of private enforcement cannot be overstated.
Federal securities laws provide for a number of express
private rights of action. The Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities
Act) provides for, among others, an express private right of action
against signers (and other involved parties) of false or misleading
registration statements and against sellers of securities who
violate the applicable registration requirements. 58 Likewise, the
Exchange Act provides for private rights of action against those
who manipulate security prices and those who file false or
57. CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2019 MIDYEAR
ASSESSMENT (2019). Although slightly dated, one study notes that securities class actions
account for nearly half of all class actions filed in federal courts. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1534, 1539 (2006).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2018).
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misleading statements.59 In addition, courts have interpreted
extensive implied private rights of action under federal securities laws.60
59. Id. §§ 78i, 78r.
60. For instance, neither Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act nor Rule 10b-5,
the most prominent securities anti-fraud provisions, provides for express private right of
action against the violators of such rules. Despite this lack of express recognition of private
right of action, in 1946, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that private right of action exists for violations of Section 10 of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 thereunder, noting that “disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and
a tort.” Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). A number of
subsequent district and circuit court cases acknowledged a private right of action for
securities law violations—even in the absence of express statutory language—and the
Supreme Court validated such implied private right of action in J. I Case v. Borak in 1964. See
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison d’Etre of
the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2017).
In deciding Borak, instead of the Kardon court’s tort approach, the Supreme Court
focused on Congressional purpose, holding that the judiciary would recognize a private
right of action to further the Congressional purpose in enacting the securities laws. Borak,
377 U.S. at 432–33 (“While [the statutory language] makes no specific reference to a private
right of action, among [the Securities Exchange Act’s] chief purposes is ‘the protection of
investors,’ which certainly implied the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result. . . . We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the duty
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose.”). Although the rationale for implying a private right of action under
the securities laws evolved, widespread recognition of such a right would firmly take hold.
See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
But the Borak approach was troublesome in that its application could expand
extremely broadly and indefinitely. See William F. Schneider, Implying Private Rights and
Remedies Under the Federal Securities Act, 62 N.C. L. REV. 853, 873 (1984) (“[B]orak and its
progeny prompted the lower federal courts to expansively imply causes of action, not only
from the securities laws, but also from many other federal statutes. It was therefore inevitable
that the pendulum would swing too far.”). In response, in 1975, the Supreme Court tempered
the Borak decision’s focus on Congressional purpose, setting forth a four-part test to
determine whether a private right of action should be inferred:
1.
“[I]s the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted”?
2.
“[I]s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a remedy or to deny one?”
3.
“[I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?”
4.
“[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?”
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Subsequent cases have confirmed this narrower approach
to implied private right of action. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560,
578 (1979) (“To the extent our analysis in today’s decision differs from that of the Court in
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However, despite extensive implied private rights of action
under securities laws inferred by federal courts, the current
prevailing view is that violations of stock exchange rules generally
do not give rise to a private right of action.61 Some relatively older
decisions have inferred or at least hinted at the possibility of
inferring private right of action for exchange rule violations, but
they are either pre-Cort cases decided under a more expansive
framework or have narrowly defined the rules whose violations
would give rise to a private right of action.62
Borak, it suffices to say that, in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard
today. . . . The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court
thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.”).
While the Cort test does not place one factor ahead of another, in practice courts
have focused largely on the second element—legislative intent—in their inference of (or
refusal to infer) private right of action.
61. See, e.g., Jablon v. Dean Witter, 614 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Congressional
intent to provide a private cause of action [for stock exchange rule violations] must therefore
be found in § 6(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act] alone. We find no such intent.”); State
Tchrs. Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[A] legislative intent to permit
a federal claim for violation of the Exchange’s Company Manual rules regarding disclosure
of corporate news cannot be inferred.”); Colman v. DH Blair & Co., 521 F. Supp. 646, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[T]hose courts which have addressed the issue have generally ruled that
no implied private right of action may be premised upon violations of NYSE or NASD
Rules.”). See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES
§ 9.03[2] (2019) (“In view of recent case law . . . it appears that such implication” of private
right of action for violation of a stock exchange rule is improbable.); John M. Bloxom IV,
Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1070–71 (1982) (“[I]n the case of section 6 [of the Securities
Exchange Act], a more restricted approach is consistent with the role of exchange rules in the
securities laws. As Congress deemed it wise not to undertake direct regulation of stock
exchange transactions and broker-client relationships, courts should be hesitant to undertake
direct regulation themselves.”); Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock
Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L. REV. 825, 831 (1970) (“But there does not appear to be a general
statutory or regulatory duty upon members to obey exchange rules.”).
62. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966) (“What
emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for violation of exchange
or dealer association rules by a member cannot be determined on the simplistic all-ornothing basis urged by the two parties; rather, the court must look to the nature of the
particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication
of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the
violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for implication would be strongest
when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law.”); Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[W]e do not now take the position . . . that
violation of an exchange rule cannot under any circumstances give rise to civil liability under
the federal acts.”).
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This general non-recognition of a private right of action for
violations of stock exchange rules has two major implications for
the structure of stock exchange rule enforcement. First, while the
private securities bar can supplement public enforcement of
securities laws, stock exchanges cannot expect such a supplemental
role from the private sector. For securities law violations—at least
for those provisions whose violations give rise to a private right of
action—the resource constraints that public enforcers face are
somewhat alleviated by the private sector’s role in enforcing those
same regulations.63 For violations of stock exchange rules, on the
other hand, lack of private right of action means that the stock
exchanges’ regulatory teams are alone in uncovering, investigating,
and sanctioning such violations.
Second—and ironically—the fact that there is no “competition”
from the private bar for enforcement of stock exchange rules can
give exchanges more freedom in addressing issuers violating their
listing standards. If private litigation for violation of stock exchange
rules were possible, issuers would be fearful of massive liability to
private investors and inclined not to self-report their violations.64
For example, in the context of securities litigation, companies resist
admitting guilt in SEC settlements, lest such admission be used

Moreover, particularly in the case of corporate governance standards (which form
an important subset of listing standards set by the NYSE and Nasdaq), the fact that corporate
governance is typically regulated by state law and that SEC plays a relatively smaller role in
this area also weigh against recognition of a private right of action. Inferring private right of
action for violations of corporate governance listing standards risks federalizing corporate
governance, beyond that intended by Congress.
63. See Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the FINRA
Institute: The Interrelationship Between Public and Private Securities Enforcement (Nov. 8,
2011) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch110811ebw
.htm). See also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 106–13 (2005) (noting the
advantages of private enforcement of regulations, including complementing limited
government resources and innovation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218
(1982) (“The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses that the role of
private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to
generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the
detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior.”).
64. Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program
Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. L. REV. 1235, 1250 (2014) (citing
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707(1997)).
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against them in subsequent or concurrent private litigation.65 Even
if the stock exchange offers a carrot—for instance, leniency for
self-reported violations—issuers would not be willing to self-report
and cooperate in exchange for that carrot, if they face a much larger
stick in the form of private litigation later on. As a result, private
litigation can hinder the regulator’s efforts to induce cooperation
from the regulated entities.66
65. David Rosenfeld, Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases: The Revolution That Wasn’t,
103 IOWA L. REV. 113, 125 (2017).
66. An example of this phenomenon can be found in the antitrust context, where selfreporting is crucial in detecting and investigating cartel activity. Daniel J. Bennett, Note,
Killing One Bird with Two Stones: The Effect of Empagran and the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 on Detecting and Deterring International Cartels, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1421, 1423 (2005). In the United States, antitrust law violations are subject to both public
and private enforcement. In particular, in private litigation, antitrust victims can recover
treble damages, encouraging the private bar to step in and enforce the antitrust laws. 15
U.S.C. § 15 (2018). However, the award of treble damages in private litigation was seen as
undermining the effectiveness of the Department of Justice’s amnesty program, which
protects companies voluntarily reporting antitrust violations from public enforcement. Jaynie
Randall, Comment, Does De-Trebling Sacrifice Recoverability of Antitrust Awards?, 23 YALE J.
ON REG. 311, 315 (2006); Glenn Harrison & Matthew Bell, Recent Enhancements in Antitrust
Criminal Enforcement: Bigger Sticks and Sweeter Carrots, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 206, 213–18,
223 (2006) (“[A]ny corporation contemplating applying for amnesty had to be aware of the
fact that any immunity from criminal prosecution did not mean immunity from civil
sanctions. . . . [T]he risk of treble damages under the Clayton Act appeared to be the greatest
deterrent to applying for amnesty . . . .”); Thomas Mueller & Gregory Evans, ACPERA and
the Value of Uncertainty, WILMERHALE, Feb. 12, 2010, https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/
insights/publications/acpera-and-the-value-of-uncertainty-february-12-2010. Thus, while
the DOJ had set up incentives vis-à-vis public enforcement to induce cooperation, such a
“carrot” was negated by the “stick” of private enforcement.
Recognizing this limitation, Congress enacted the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement
and Reform Act (ACPERA) in 2004. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661, 665–69. Among others, ACPERA de-trebled
the civil damage that leniency applicants are subject to in a civil proceeding, provided that
the applicant provides “satisfactory cooperation” to the plaintiff in the civil action. Id. § 213.
Therefore, if a cartel participant cooperates with the public authorities and with the civil
action plaintiff, it is not only protected from public enforcement but also faces only actual—
as opposed to treble—damages in private litigation. At the time of ACPERA’s passage, it was
contemplated that this additional carrot in the private enforcement context would further
promote voluntary cooperation by cartel participants.
As with any law, it is difficult to determine for certain whether ACPERA was fully successful
in its stated goal. However, one GAO study, examining the six years before and the six years
after ACPERA’s enactment, found that while the total number of amnesty applications
remained similar, the amnesty applicants in cartels of which the Justice Department had no
prior knowledge (so-called “Type A applicants”) increased nearly twofold, concluding that
ACPERA had “slight positive effect” on amnesty applications. Amy B. Manning, ACPERA Eight Years Later, “Satisfactory Cooperation” Lacks a “Satisfactory” Definition, MCGUIREWOODS 9–
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In the absence of a private right of action for stock exchange
violations, exchanges can engage in one-on-one cooperation with
the issuers they regulate, without fear of the private bar shortcircuiting such cooperation. In order to remain in the exchanges’
good graces, issuers would be inclined to self-report violations,
enhancing exchanges’ enforcement efforts. On the flip side,
exchanges can offer incentives—such as informal forbearance—
particularly to issuers that cooperate with exchanges’ regulatory
teams. This voluntary cooperation is especially important in the
context of stock exchange rules, since exchanges have limited
resources that cannot be supplemented by private enforcement.
In short, a lack of private right of action for stock exchange rule
violations leads to effects that feed back into one another. Because
exchanges cannot rely on the private bar to enforce their rules, they
are subject to resource and information restraints, making
voluntary cooperation important. On the other hand, for stock
exchange rule violations, the absence of private bar involvement
helps the formation of a one-on-one cycle of cooperation between
the exchange and the issuer and helps the exchange induce issuers’
voluntary cooperation.
II. CURRENT PRACTICE OF STOCK EXCHANGE RULE ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE
These peculiarities of stock exchange regulation noted above
create a mix of opposing factors in stock exchange rule
enforcement. Critics of industry self-regulation may expect
collusion, conflict of interest, lax enforcement, and therefore lax
compliance. Those who are more optimistic about the industry’s
ability to self-regulate may expect the exchanges to vigorously
enforce their regulations to protect their reputation. In order to
determine which of these factors are most relevant, we now
examine the status quo of stock exchange enforcement and
compliance, based on firm-level disclosures of listing standard
noncompliance and of their board composition, in each case from
2019, supplemented by interviews with industry insiders.
10
(2012),
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/antitrust/
ACPERA-Eight-Years-Later.pdf. Moreover, the positive effect of ACPERA may have been
tempered by ambiguity in the definition of “satisfactory cooperation,” making it uncertain
whether an amnesty applicant would indeed receive the benefit of ACPERA’s de-trebling. Id.
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A. Lax Enforcement of Stock Exchange Rules
As noted in Part I, stock exchanges’ continued listing standards
applicable to issuers can be broadly classified into three categories:
quantitative criteria; disclosure-related rules; and corporate
governance rules. Upon detection of violation of a listing rule—
whether it be through voluntary disclosure by the listed company
or through stock exchange’s monitoring—the enforcement process
typically begins informally; the exchange’s regulatory team may
engage in informal conversations with the violating issuer to
encourage remedial action and compliance.67
1. Formal Enforcement of Stock Exchange Rules
When noncompliance with a rule warrants action beyond
informal negotiation and conversation with an issuer, formal
enforcement of an exchange’s rules generally involves multiple
escalating steps, from initial noncompliance notice (or public
reprimand letter) to ultimate delisting. In the case of the NYSE,
within ten business days of identification of noncompliance, the
exchange is to notify the listed company, in writing, of its
noncompliance.68 Within 45 days of the notification letter’s receipt,
the listed company must submit a plan of compliance to the NYSE,
which is subject to exchange review.69 If the NYSE accepts such a
plan of compliance, it provides an 18-month cure period within
which the listed company can regain compliance.70
If the NYSE does not accept such a plan of compliance or the
listed company fails to regain compliance during the cure period,
67. Macey, O’Hara & Pompilio, supra note 11, at 688. A number of practitioners noted
that exchanges may sometimes provide advance guidance as well, particularly when an
issuer is uncertain about compliance with a rule. For example, an issuer may inquire whether
a particular transaction or conduct complies with a listing rule, and the exchange may
provide guidance on how to achieve compliance. In cases where a noncompliant transaction
has already occurred, exchanges may sometimes “forgive” such noncompliance and guide
the issuer toward compliance in the next iteration.
68. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 802.02.
69. Id.
70. Id. In some cases, the cure period differs from the default 18 months. For example,
for delinquency in filing SEC-required periodic reports, a listed company initially has six
months to file delinquent reports, subject to an additional six months that can be granted at
NYSE’s discretion. Id. § 802.01E. Likewise, for noncompliance with $1.00 minimum price
requirement, a listed company has a six-month cure period. Id. § 802.01C. In some cases, NYSE
also has discretion to initiate suspension and delisting procedures immediately. Id. § 802.02.
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the NYSE can initiate delisting procedures by notifying the listed
company of the delisting determination and issuing a public press
release.71 Within ten business days of the NYSE staff’s notification,
the subject issuer can appeal the staff’s determination to a
committee of the Board of Directors of the NYSE.72 Generally, the
company’s stock would continue trading during the appeal period.
If the company does not appeal the staff’s delisting determination
or the NYSE Board of Directors upholds the staff’s determination,
the company’s securities will be suspended and delisted.73
Nasdaq provides a similar escalating enforcement process, with
a few notable differences. First, under Nasdaq regulations, rule
violations are classified into four categories: (1) those that result in
immediate delisting; (2) those for which the cure period is subject
to Nasdaq staff review of compliance plan; (3) those for which the
listed company is automatically granted a cure period; and (4) those
for which a public reprimand letter is issued.74 If the Nasdaq staff
determines that continued listing raises “a public interest concern”
(among other grounds), the security is subject to immediate
delisting. For noncompliance with certain corporate governance
standards (e.g., shareholder meeting, shareholder approval), a
requirement to file periodic reports, and certain quantitative
criteria (e.g., minimum equity, number of stockholders), the staff
can grant a cure period of up to 180 days, subject to its review and
approval of the listed company’s compliance plan.75 For a number
of other continued listing standards—including minimum bid
price, majority independent board, and audit committee
composition—the listed company is automatically granted a
specified cure period (typically 180 days, but varies depending on
the type of violation).76
Second, unlike the NYSE, Nasdaq has a multi-step appeal
process. Upon Nasdaq staff’s delisting determination, the subject
company can appeal to the Nasdaq Hearing Panel. If the Nasdaq
Hearing Panel upholds the delisting determination, it can then
71. Id. § 804.00
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Nasdaq Rule § 5810(c). As noted above, the NYSE also has the power to issue
public reprimand letters.
75. Id. § 5810-1(c)(1).
76. Id. § 5810-2(B)(i).
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appeal to the Nasdaq Listing and Hearing Review Council. The
Listing and Hearing Review Council’s decision is further subject to
discretionary review by the Board of Directors of Nasdaq.77 Thus,
Nasdaq provides a much longer appeal process than NYSE does.
In both cases, under Section 19(f) of the Exchange Act, the SEC
can review the delisting decision by the NYSE or Nasdaq, as such a
decision constitutes a denial of access to services by a self-regulatory
organization. However, as noted previously, the SEC’s review is
limited to whether the factual basis for the decision exists, whether
the decision was made in accordance with the rules of the exchange,
and whether the rules were applied in a manner consistent with the
goals of the Exchange Act, and exchange delisting determinations
are rarely overturned at the SEC appeal stage.
2. Federal Disclosure Data on Stock Exchange Enforcements
Once a stock exchange initiates enforcement for noncompliance
with a continued listing standard, the federal securities laws
impose a disclosure obligation on the listed company. In an
Exchange Act Form 8-K (Item 3.01), an Exchange Act registrant is
required to disclose: (1) notice of noncompliance with the
continued listing standards of the exchange on which the
registrant’s common equity is principally listed; (2) notice of
exchange-initiated delisting from such exchange; (3) registrant’s
voluntary notice to its stock exchange of noncompliance with
applicable continued listing standards; (4) public reprimand or
similar communication from a registrant’s stock exchange for
violation of continued listing standards; and (5) voluntary delisting
decisions.78 As a result, Form 8-K Item 3.01 disclosures provide a
complete picture of enforcement actions taken by stock exchanges
in the United States against issuers for noncompliance with
continued listing standards, including notice of noncompliance,
suspension, and/or delisting.79
Thus, in order to examine the status quo of stock exchange rule
enforcement against issuers, we collected data on enforcement
77. Id. § 5825.
78. Form 8-K for Current Reports, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2019).
79. Item 3.01 triggering events include listed companies’ voluntary delisting decisions
(including as a result of merger) that are unrelated to stock exchange rule violations, so Item
3.01 disclosures are actually overinclusive.
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actions from all Form 8-Ks filed in 2019 that made a disclosure
under Item 3.01. Table 1 below shows the breakdown of Item 3.01
disclosures by type of disclosure and exchange, excluding
duplicate items.80
TABLE 1: ITEM 3.01 DISCLOSURES BY TYPE OF DISCLOSURE AND
EXCHANGE
Type
Voluntary Delisting or
Transfer (including as
a result of merger)
Noncompliance Notice
Involuntary Delisting
Other (e.g.,
compliance, extension
of cure period)
Total

NYSE

Nasdaq

Other
(e.g.,
OTC)

Total

112

115

12

239

91
26

317
91

1
0

409
117

8

65

0

73

237

588

13

838

Of the 838 Item 3.01 disclosures (excluding duplicates),
approximately 29% (239) relate to voluntary delisting or transfer,
which may be as a result of a merger, board decision to save listing
costs, or transfer to another exchange. The remainder relates to
noncompliance with a continued listing standard. Approximately
half of Item 3.01 disclosures in 2019 disclose a notice of
noncompliance, while 14% disclose a notice of delisting. Some of the
notices of delisting are as a result of failure to cure noncompliance
during the grace period, while others are as a result of exchange
decision to immediately suspend and delist the subject security.
Slightly less than 9% disclose other items related to noncompliance

80. The exchanges’ websites also disclose the issuers that are noncompliant with a listing
standard. However, the websites only contain the issuers that remain noncompliant as of that
particular moment and does not include whether a certain issuer was noncompliant at a past
moment. See, e.g., Noncompliant Issuers, NYSE REGULATION, https://www.nyse.com/
regulation/noncompliant-issuers (Last visited Oct. 20, 2021); Noncompliant Companies, NASDAQ,
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/noncompliantcompanylist.aspx (Last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
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with a rule, including that the listed company has regained
compliance or that the cure period has been granted or extended.81
As noted above, the stock exchanges have two potential
sanctions at their disposal: public reprimand or delisting. Other
“sanctions”—such as suspension—are not independent sanctions
per se but preludes to public reprimand or (most often) delisting.
Likewise, although notice of noncompliance is publicly disclosed
pursuant to SEC rules and such disclosure can have negative effects
on the violating company, the notice itself is not a sanction but
preliminary steps toward a formal sanction.
Between these two potential sanctions, we note an extremely
rare use of the public reprimand sanction compared to the delisting
sanction. In 2019, only three public reprimand letters from stock
exchanges were disclosed in Form 8-K filings, all of which related
to failure to obtain stockholder approval for offering of shares
representing 20% or more of the voting power of the issuer. In these
cases, since the offering has already taken place, it appears that the
stock exchanges rely on public reprimand letters to deter future
violations. In the vast majority of other cases, while the notice of
noncompliance does have some shaming function, the exchanges
retain the flexibility to escalate to the delisting sanction, depending
on the cooperation and remediation by the noncompliant issuer.
We also classified the noncompliance notices and involuntary
delisting actions by the type of noncompliance that gave rise to
such notice/delisting action, and the result is presented in Table 2.
A
significant
majority—nearly
three-quarter—of
the
noncompliance and delisting notices are based on failure to meet
quantitative criteria for continued listing, such as the $1.00 price
minimum or market capitalization minimum. Delinquent periodic
reports account for 12% of the total, and corporate governance
violations, including failure to constitute the board and board
committees in accordance with exchange regulations, failure to
hold an annual meeting, or failure to obtain shareholder approval
as required, account for another 12%. Other violations, such as
failure to pay listing fees, bankruptcy, and listing contrary to the
public interest, account for the remainder; given the severity of

81. While these items are not required to be disclosed (since they relate to compliance,
rather than noncompliance), a substantial number of companies voluntarily report them.
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these “other” violations, as expected, all of them involve direct
delisting notices.
TABLE 2: NONCOMPLIANCE/DELISTING NOTICES BY TYPE OF
VIOLATION
Violation
Type
Quantitative
Criteria
Delinquent
Periodic
Report
Corporate
Governance
Other
Total

Noncompliance
Notice

Delisting

Subtotal

Percentage
of Total

295

84

379

72%

54

10

64

12%

60

1

61

12%

0
409

22
117

22
526

4%
100%

A few items are worth noting from these data. First, stock
exchanges’ formal enforcement is focused largely on continued
listing standards that are easily observable. Failure to comply with
the quantitative criteria for continued listing is easily observable
based on listed companies’ market data and financial reports, and
delinquency in filing periodic reports is also observable,
particularly since periodic report deadlines are mostly
synchronized. The fact that violations of these criteria are easily
observable also means that they give rise to much less discretion in
enforcement, which may explain their accounting for a vast
majority of formal enforcement actions. Another potential
explanation for this concentration of enforcement actions is that
stock exchanges may view the failure to meet quantitative criteria
as affecting the liquidity in the trading markets, directly and
immediately undermining the quality of the product they offer. An
implication of the exchanges’ apparent emphasis on quantitative
listing criteria and financial reports is that exchanges’ enforcement
is ironically concentrated on violations for which the listed
companies are arguably less culpable. Noncompliance with
quantitative continued listing standards can arise due to a number
of factors—including market factors—many of which are beyond
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the listed company’s control, but these standards are precisely the
ones that the exchanges focus the most on.
Second, among enforcement actions for corporate governance
violations, more than half stem from listed companies’
voluntary reporting. For example, upon death or departure of an
independent director that leads to breach of majority independent
board requirement or ex post revelation that a transaction that did not
receive shareholder approval was indeed subject to the shareholder
vote requirement, a listed company would voluntarily report such
violation to the exchange, which in turn would provide the cure
period as prescribed in the exchange regulations. Of the 61
noncompliance/delisting notices based on a violation of corporate
governance standards, 37 arose out of the listed company’s selfreporting. Thus, formal enforcement for violations of corporate
governance standards that have been detected by exchanges
without the issuer’s self-reporting appears to be rare.
Third, only a fraction of issuers that receive a noncompliance
notice end up in the delisting process.82 Given extended cure
periods, most companies are able to cure their deficiencies before
delisting procedures commence. This is particularly pronounced
for corporate governance violations, as only one company faced
delisting in 2019 for noncompliance with a corporate governance
standard. Moreover, even after the delisting process begins, as a
result of issuers’ ability to appeal the delisting decision, only twothirds of the issuers initially subject to delisting actually end up
delisted; of 117 companies whose delisting process began in 2019,
41, or 35% of the total, still remain listed. Even after formal
enforcement for stock exchange rule violation is initiated, there are
a number of “escape hatches” that allow a listed company to remain
listed, and actual delisting only occurs for a small fraction of the
noncompliant issuers.
One recent delisting illustrates the long leash afforded to listed
companies by exchanges. On October 2, 2018, USA Technologies,

82. Our dataset is a snapshot of disclosures made in 2019, and the delisting notices
that were disclosed in 2019 often stem from noncompliance that occurred in 2018 or earlier.
However, in the absence of drastic policy change between 2018 and 2019, it is reasonable to
assume that comparing delisting notices from 2019 with the noncompliance notices from the
same year gives an approximation of the likelihood that a noncompliant issuer ends up
facing the delisting process. Based on this assumption, only about one-quarter of companies
that receive a noncompliance notice end up in the delisting stage.
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Inc., then a Nasdaq-listed company, received initial notice of
noncompliance due to its failure to file its annual report (Form 10K) on time.83 A month later, on November 14, the company again
received notice of noncompliance for failure to file its quarterly
report on time.84 At that time, pursuant to Nasdaq’s decision to
accept the company’s plan of compliance, Nasdaq granted the
company until March 12, 2019, to file its delinquent reports.
On February 26, 2019, however, Nasdaq determined that the
company would not be in a position to file its delinquent reports by
the March 12 deadline and commenced delisting procedures.85 In
response to Nasdaq’s determination, the company appealed to the
Nasdaq Hearings Panel, which granted an extension until
September 9, 2019, to regain compliance. In the meantime,
however, the company received two additional noncompliance
notices, one for failure to file a quarterly report on time (May 14)
and one for failure to hold an annual meeting (July 10), and failed
to regain compliance with its periodic filing obligations by the
September 9 extended deadline.86 As a result, the delisting
procedure resumed, but the company again appealed the delisting
determination to the Nasdaq Listing and Hearing Review Council,
which affirmed the delisting decision. The company was finally
delisted on February 4, 2020.87 Thus, from the initial noncompliance
to delisting, with multiple compliance cure periods and two
appeals, it took more than sixteen months.
Taken together, the Form 8-K disclosures we collected indicate
that exchanges infrequently rely on their “big stick,” particularly
for corporate governance standard violations. Exchanges often rely
on “informal enforcement”—starting with conversations and
negotiations with the noncompliant issuer—to prod the listed
83. USA Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 1, 2018)
84. USA Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 20, 2018).
85. USA Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 4, 2019).
86. USA Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 20, 2019); USA
Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 16, 2019).
87. USA Technologies, Inc., Notification of Removal from Listing and/or Registration
(Form 25) (Feb. 5, 2020). The company’s stock is still traded on the OTC market after delisting
from Nasdaq. When a company fails to file a Form 10-K, SEC Rule 12b-25 requires that the
company file a Form NT and the timely filing of the form gives the company a one-time grace
period. If the company fails to file its Form 10-K within the grace period—at least in theory—
the company’s stock can be subject to the SEC’s administrative proceedings. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-25 (2019).
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company into complying. When the exchanges do engage in formal
enforcement actions, they focus largely on the failure to meet
quantitative criteria for continued listing and the failure to file SECmandated periodic reports, and enforcement actions for violations
of corporate governance listing standards are rare. Combined with
lengthy cure periods and multi-step appeal process prescribed by
the exchange regulations, such a pattern of formal enforcement
means that a listed company would rarely face suspension and
delisting for their noncompliance.
B. Rigorous Compliance with Stock Exchange Rules
In the previous section, we showed that the stock exchanges’
formal disciplinary sanctions are rare, especially for corporate
governance standard violations. While the analysis of Form 8-K
Item 3.01 captures the full picture of stock exchanges’ enforcement
activities against listed companies in 2019, it does not necessarily
describe how well companies are in compliance with the exchange
rules. After all, a low level of enforcement activities may indicate a
low level of detection of noncompliance. To better understand the
implications of a low level of enforcement and focusing on the
corporate governance requirements (with which exchanges’
enforcement appears to be most lax), we examined a separate set of
data on corporate board compositions of S&P 1500 companies to
see the current status of compliance with the corporate governance
requirements in stock exchange rules. The results indicate that
compliance with stock exchange rules is robust despite the low
level of enforcement.
1. Stock exchanges’ corporate governance requirements
In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals and
revelations of lax internal controls of public companies, calls for
reform led to an overhaul of stock exchanges’ corporate governance
listing standards, and on November 4, 2003, the SEC approved the
NYSE and Nasdaq’s proposed rule changes on corporate
governance requirements “to ensure the independence of directors
of listed companies and to strengthen corporate governance
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practices.”88 Most notably, the exchanges required listed companies
to have a board of directors with a majority of independent
directors (“majority independent board”)89 and to have board
committees (e.g., audit, compensation, and nominating committee)
comprised exclusively of independent directors (“independent
committees”).90 Listed companies must also affirmatively
determine whether each director is qualified as an independent
director under the definitions offered by stock exchange rules.91
An affirmative determination of independence is either made
by a mechanical application of the bright-line disqualification
criteria of stock exchange rules,92 or by the assessment of potential
impairment of each director’s independent judgment.93 Courts
distinguish the two types of independence determination and
protect a board’s evaluation beyond the application of the
bright-line rule as “the product of the board’s business
judgment.”94 The determination is made by the nominating
committee, the members of which are independent directors
themselves.95 For large companies, it is not uncommon that
88. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, SEC Rel. No.
34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64, 154 (Nov. 4, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.
The NYSE and Nasdaq submitted a proposal and its amendments respectively in 2002 and
the SEC approved both exchanges’ proposals on November 4, 2003. For the role of
monitoring boards, see Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–72
(1997). For the adoption of stock exchange rules emphasizing board independence, see
Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1749, 1818 (2010); Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 FLA.
L. REV. 87, 151–52 (2014).
89. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.01; Nasdaq Rule § 4350(c)(1).
90. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.01; Nasdaq Rule § 4350(c)(1). Unlike NYSE,
Nasdaq does not mandate an independent nominating committee, and director nomination
can be done by majority of the independent directors. Also, only NYSE requires its listed
company to post the company’s three mandatory (audit, compensation, and nominating)
committee charters on the company’s website. NYSE Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.0406. For a comprehensive analysis of corporate governance documents published through
S&P 1500 companies’ websites, see Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 1097 (2020).
91. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02; Nasdaq Rule § 4200(a)(15).
92. E.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(b).
93. E.g., id. § 303A.02(a) Commentary (“[I]t is best that boards making ‘independence’
determinations broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances.”).
94. Forestal v. Caldwell, 739 Fed. App’x 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2018).
95. See, e.g., Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Charter, APPLE INC.,
(“Purpose: To consider and report periodically to the Board of Directors on matters relating
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their independent directors are executives of other companies
or directors sitting on multiple boards simultaneously, and both
due to time constraints and limited access to inside information,
the nominating committee members’ determinations largely rely
on the information self-reported by the subject directors.96
Nominating committees evaluate directors’ self-reported conflicts
of interest along with the bright-line disqualifying factors for
independence, and self-report its independence determination to
stock exchanges. Such a double-self-reporting mechanism makes it
harder for stock exchanges to validate a listed company’s
independence determination.
2. Self-reporting compliance: corporate governance affirmation
Unlike the quantitative listing standards, corporate governance
requirements of stock exchange rules demand qualitative
assessment of director independence, and it is more difficult to
detect noncompliance without the listed company’s cooperation.
Thus, solely for the corporate governance requirements, the NYSE
requires self-reporting of noncompliance, and the enforcement of
stock exchange rules heavily relies on self-reporting.
Companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq have an obligation
to self-report compliance with corporate governance requirements,
but the level of rigor differs. First, the NYSE expressly requires that
a listed company submit an annual and interim written affirmation
in addition to the disclosure requirements of Section 303A.97 The
affirmation should be accompanied by the certification of the

to the identification, selection and qualification of the Board of Directors and candidates
nominated to the Board of Directors[.]”). Regulation S-K mandates companies to disclose
whether the determination has been made that a director is independent. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(a)(1)(i) (2019). See also NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.6; Nasdaq Rule
§ 5605(c)(2).
96. See, e.g., Guidelines Regarding Director Conflicts of Interest, APPLE INC. (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://s2.q4cdn.com/470004039/files/doc_downloads/gov_docs/2018.02.12_Director_C
onflicts_Guidelines.pdf (“The Corporation’s General Counsel will survey each director
annually to determine if the director has any actual or potential conflicts of interest with the
Corporation. In addition, any director who becomes aware of an actual or potential conflict
of interest with the Corporation at any time during the year shall notify the Corporation’s
General Counsel promptly in writing of the material facts of the actual or potential conflict
of interest. The Corporation’s General Counsel shall notify the Chair of the Nominating and
Corporate Governance Committee of such facts.”).
97. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.12(c).
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company’s CEO.98 By contrast, Nasdaq does not expressly require
equivalent corporate governance certification, and a Nasdaq-listed
company needs to submit a corporate governance certification
upon its initial listing,99 and needs to modify the certification only
when there is a change from the initial certification.100
When listed companies notify noncompliance, stock exchanges
are likely to start an enforcement process, but as we discussed in the
earlier section, stock exchanges mostly guide companies to comply
with the requirements during the cure period. In the next section, we
examine whether scarce enforcement is due to the poor detection rate
associated with the low quality of self-reporting, or due to the high
compliance rate of the corporate governance requirements.
3. Current practice of compliance
In order to examine the current status of compliance, we use the
S&P 1500 companies’ data on board compositions.101 The main
dataset is from BoardEx,102 and we cross-checked the BoardEx data
with information disclosed in companies’ proxy statements.
Corresponding to stock exchanges’ enforcement activities in 2019,
we collected data from proxy statements prepared for annual
meetings in 2020, which summarizes board activities in the 2019
fiscal year and also shows board nominees for the 2020 fiscal year.
a. Majority independent board. Looking at the board
composition for the fiscal year 2019, all but ten companies had the
majority of independent directors on the board as required. Not
many companies stood on the borderline of the 50% threshold, and
most companies surpassed the required threshold easily. About
10% of the companies had a board comprised of more than 90% of
98. Id. § 303A.12(a), (b).
99. Corporate
Governance
Certification
Form,
NASDAQ LISTING CENTER
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/ViewPDF.aspx?CGCertForm.aspx?Preview=CGC&Print
=N&filenm=Corporate%20Governance%20Certification%20Form (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
100. Nasdaq Rule § 5625 (Notification of Noncompliance).
101. Although S&P 1500 does not fully demonstrate the current compliance of all U.S.
listed companies, the index is still a representative sample covering about 90% of the market
capitalization of the U.S. stock market. It contains large-sized (S&P 500), medium-sized (S&P
400), and small-sized (S&P 600) companies. Because funds and trusts’ corporate governance is
significantly different from traditional listed companies’, we excluded them from our analysis.
102. BoardEx database is constructed with information on company websites, annual
reports, and public filings. Data Quality, BOARDEX, https://corp.boardex.com/data-quality/
(last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
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independent directors. All ten companies that do not have the
majority independent board are controlled companies, which are
exempted from the requirements.103 That is, all companies are in
compliance with the requirement.
However, the practice of the supermajority independent board
was already in trend before the adoption of the majority independent
board requirement in 2003.104 While the stock exchanges’ majority
independent board requirement confirmed the monitoring function
of independent directors and extended the requirement to all listed
companies, it did not initiate the trend for most companies.
Nonetheless, the zero-noncompliance rate illustrates strong
adherence to the requirements imposed by stock exchanges.
b. Independent board committees. The stock exchanges’
corporate governance requirements adopted in 2003 more
profoundly influenced the structure of board committees. NYSE
Listed Company Manual requires three mandatory board
committees: Audit, Compensation, and Nominating/Corporate
Governance Committees.105 For Nasdaq-listed companies, a standalone nominating committee is optional, and the independent
directors constituting the majority of all independent directors on
the board can select director nominees instead.106 The members of
each of these board committees should be independent directors.107
All S&P 1500 companies had an audit committee with at least
three independent directors. Besides controlled companies
utilizing exemptions from the requirements,108 all but seven
companies had an independent committee with a title that included
the word “compensation.” The seven deviating companies had a
103. See infra Section II.C.4.
104. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1475 (2007)
(documenting the proportion of independent directors surpassed 50% prior to 1995 and
reached approximately 75% in 2005).
105. NYSE Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.04–06.
106. Nasdaq Rule § 5605(e)(1).
107. A more stringent independence standard applies to audit and compensation
committee members. NYSE Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.04–06; Nasdaq Rule § 5605(c)-(e).
108. Although Coty Inc. (NYSE: COTY) claims that the company has “decided not to
take advantage of these [controlled company] exemptions,” the company has two board
committees (Audit and Finance Committee & Remuneration and Nomination Committee),
and the same committee reviews executive compensation and director nomination, which
does not comply with the NYSE’s board committee requirements. Coty Inc., Proxy Statement
(Form DEF14A) (Sept. 25, 2019).
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committee with different names but functionally equivalent to a
compensation committee.109 As for nominating committees, all S&P
1500 companies either had a standalone nominating committee
(sometimes with variations in name as permitted by Nasdaq) or
had director nominees selected by the independent directors
constituting the majority of all independent directors on the board
instead of a standalone nominating committee (as permitted by
Nasdaq).110 Also illustrating this strong compliance pattern, Expedia
formed a nominating committee on the exact day (without taking
advantage of the phase-in period it was entitled to) it ceased to be a
controlled company and was no longer exempt.111 Thus, we were
unable to find a single S&P 1500 company not in compliance with
board committee requirements imposed by the stock exchanges.
C. Curious Case of Rigorous Compliance with Lax Enforcement
One limitation of using proxy statement disclosures to measure
the current practice of compliance is that information in proxy
statements only captures a “snapshot” of compliance around the
time of an annual shareholder meeting and does not show whether
the company complied during the time between shareholder
meetings. The stock exchanges’ enforcement activities described in
the earlier section mostly occurred between the shareholder
meetings. While noncompliance between shareholder meetings is
possible and does happen, at minimum, having to file proxy
statements offers a strong incentive for the companies to comply
with the stock exchange rules at least once a year. In that sense, a
question remains: Why do companies comply with stock exchange
rules despite the seemingly lax enforcement?

109. The variations of a compensation committee name include: People Resources
Committee (CIGNA Corp.), Personal and Organization Committee (Colgate-Palmolive Co.),
Personnel Committee (Entergy Corp.), Executive Resources Committee (RLI Corp.), Salary
and Employee Benefits Committee (Selective Insurance Group Inc.), and Management
Planning and Development Committee (CVS Health Corp. & Yum! Brands Inc.).
110. Nasdaq Rule § 5605(e). In our sample, fifty-eight (approximately 10.5%) Nasdaq
listed companies do not have a standalone nominating committee.
111. Expedia Group, Inc. ceased to be a controlled company following the closing of
the Liberty Expedia Transaction and formed a nominating committee with two
independent directors on July 26, 2019. See Expedia Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement 12-14
(Form DEF14A) (May 7, 2020).
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1. SEC disclosure requirements
One possible explanation can be the SEC’s disclosure
requirements. The SEC Regulation S-K Item 407(a) requires each
company to identify and list all independent directors in its proxy
statement, and identify any audit, compensation, and nominating
committee member who is not independent under each
committee’s independence standard.112 Accordingly, if a company
does not disclose whether each director is independent, both the
SEC and the company’s shareholders can claim a violation of the
SEC rules, since, at least in theory, such non-disclosure can
constitute a material omission.
On the other hand, whether the SEC or shareholders can
challenge a company’s disclosure of director independence based
on the claim of material misstatement is questionable. One recent
case demonstrates the difficulty of carrying such a claim. In
Teamsters Union 25 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Baiera, the plaintiff
claimed direct injury allegedly caused by material misstatements in
the company’s (Orbitz) 2014 proxy statement. The company, using
the proxy statement, sought stockholder votes in connection with
the election of directors. However, the proxy statement, according
to the plaintiff, falsely identified three directors as being
independent.113 The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the case
for failure to state a claim because the plaintiff failed to argue that
the proxy statement “failed to accurately disclose all material facts
relevant to assessing the independence of any of Orbitz’s directors
under Delaware law[.]”114 The court stated that the “[p]laintiff’s
challenge to the propriety of an independence determination under
the NYSE Rules does not undermine the sufficiency of the
disclosures in the 2014 proxy statement.”115 According to the court,
since the plaintiff challenged the substance of the board’s
independence determination for the three directors under the
NYSE listing standard, the plaintiff should have established that
112. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2020). For an analysis of disclosure practices associated with
independent directors, see Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of
Related Party Transactions, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663 (2014); Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out
of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 52 (2017).
113. Teamsters Union 25 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Baiera, 119 A. 3d 44, 68. (Del.
Ch. 2015).
114. Id. at 48, 69 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 69.
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the board violated the NYSE rules.116 Most importantly, according
to the court, the plaintiff, “fail[ed] to allege any indication from the
NYSE that Orbitz has done anything wrong under the NYSE
Rules”117 (emphasis added). The court’s reasoning suggests that
whether a company complies with the stock exchange rules cannot
be determined by the shareholders but can only be determined by
the relevant exchange.
Furthermore, with respect to the board composition
requirements, the SEC disclosure rules focus on making
information about director independence publicly available and do
not impose substantive requirements on stock exchange rules.118
Thus, as long as companies disclose which director is qualified as
an independent director in compliance with the stock exchanges’
criteria, and disclose the composition of the board committees, not
having a majority independent board or independent committees
does not constitute a violation of the SEC rule.119 In that sense, the
SEC disclosure requirements are limited in their ability to enforce
compliance with the stock exchange rules.
2. Supplemental role of stock exchange corporate
governance requirements
One could also argue that stock exchanges are not inclined to
enforce their corporate governance requirements and instead focus
their attention on quantitative requirements because the failure to
meet quantitative requirements directly affects the liquidity and
external perception of the stock exchanges, whereas corporate

116. Id. at 69–70.
117. Id. at 70.
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(b)(3) (2020) (“State whether or not the registrant has
standing audit, nominating and compensation committees of the board of directors, or
committees performing similar functions. If the registrant has such committees, however
designated, identify each committee member . . . .”); id. at (a) (when a company does not
have a “separately designated audit, nominating or compensation committee or committee
performing similar functions,” the company must disclose all non-independent directors
applying such committee independence standards that stock exchanges provide); id. at (c)(1)
(“If the registrant does not have a standing nominating committee or committee performing
similar functions, state the basis for the view of the board of directors that it is appropriate
for the registrant not to have such a committee and identify each director who participates
in the consideration of director nominees.”); id. at (e)(1) (“If the registrant does not have a
standing compensation committee . . . .”).
119. Id.
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governance requirements do not have such a direct impact on the
stock exchanges’ reputational capital. Moreover, given that
corporate governance has traditionally been in the purview of state
corporate law, stock exchanges may not emphasize their role in
enforcing corporate governance requirements as much as their role
in enforcing quantitative requirements.
This explanation for stock exchanges’ lax enforcement of their
own corporate governance rules overemphasizes the degree of
overlap between state corporate law and stock exchanges’
corporate governance requirements. In fact, among the stock
exchange corporate governance requirements, the most notable
ones—e.g., shareholder vote upon issuance of stock with 20% or
more in voting power, majority independent board, mandatory
board committees—have no equivalent in state corporate law.
If stock exchange corporate governance requirements did not exist,
state corporate law would not impose any similar requirements.
Furthermore, this explanation does not account for the fact that
stock exchanges often impose sanctions for failure to file periodic
reports as mandated by the SEC; if the “supplemental role”
explanation held, then one would expect the stock exchanges to
also defer to the SEC in enforcing periodic disclosure rules.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that stock exchanges do not view
corporate governance as their main regulatory area, this does not
explain issuers’ rigorous compliance with corporate governance
rules imposed by stock exchanges. After all, one would actually
expect the opposite; if stock exchanges view their role as merely
supplemental to state corporate law, such a view will downplay the
importance of compliance to the issuers, which runs against the
pattern of rigorous compliance we see.
3. Proxy advisors’ voting guidelines
Another possible explanation for the compliance can be proxy
advisors’ voting guidelines prepared for institutional investors.
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), a dominant proxy
advisor, has a voting guideline that recommends voting against
non-independent directors when a company (1) does not have
a majority independent board, (2) has a non-independent director
as a member of the audit, compensation, or nominating
committees, (3) lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating
committee, or (4) lacks a formal stand-alone nominating committee,
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“even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the
functions of such a committee.”120
The ISS’s influence on director elections, however, does not
fully explain why more than 10% of companies on Nasdaq do not
have a standalone nominating or governance committee, despite
the ISS voting guidelines.121 Although these companies are in
compliance with Nasdaq listing standards, their lack of a
standalone nominating or governance committee runs against ISS
voting guidelines. This indicates that in many cases, companies will
step outside proxy advisors’ voting guidelines, as long as they stay
within the limits of stock exchange regulations, and that therefore,
proxy advisors’ influence cannot fully account for the compliance
pattern we noted above.122 Furthermore, ISS’s actual voting
recommendation for each company is not always identical to its
general voting guideline.123
4. Voluntary compliance as “best practice”
Lastly, one could posit that listed issuers may comply with
stock exchanges’ corporate governance requirements because they
represent the “best practice” in corporate governance, and thus
there is an independent reason for the issuers’ compliance. Under
this argument, the curious coexistence of lax enforcement and
rigorous compliance is not a puzzle, because the stock exchanges’

120. ISS voting guidelines list the triggering events corresponding to the NYSE Listing
Manual’s independence requirements, which incentivizes Nasdaq-listed companies to
follow the more stringent NYSE requirements. For instance, even if a Nasdaq-listed
company decides not to have a standalone nominating committee, although it does not
violate the Nasdaq rule as long as its independent board members carry out director
nominations, the lack of a nominating committee itself directly triggers the ISS’s objections
to the election of non-independent directors or the entire board members. ISS, U.S. PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES, BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf.
121. See supra note 110.
122. Id.
123. On a more generalized note, an empirical study found that an actual ISS
recommendation shifts only 6%–10% of shareholder votes on specific issues that ISS
recommended, considering the underlying factors, which shows that the impact of ISS’s
voting guideline may not be as significant as to shape the compliance practice across
companies. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth Or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 903 (2010). It is worth noting, however, that the study is not on
the governance changes deviating from ISS recommendations, which may trigger bigger
shift of vote against in director elections.
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corporate governance requirements are not the limiting factor;
companies adopt the majority independent board and three board
committees not because the stock exchanges require them to but
because they believe it is the best thing to do for themselves.
There may be some validity to this argument. The rationale for
the stock exchanges to adopt the corporate governance
requirements—to strengthen internal control—applies to the
companies themselves as well, and to the extent that the listed
issuers are well-intentioned and want strong internal controls, they
would be incentivized to adopt the practices delineated in the stock
exchanges’ corporate governance requirements. Thus, a substantial
portion of the S&P 1500 companies’ “compliance” with the stock
exchange corporate governance requirements can be explained
with this “voluntary adoption” argument.
But whether the internal incentives are so strong that not a single
S&P 1500 company violates the stock exchange corporate
governance requirements is doubtful. First, adoption of the “best
practices” is not costless. General counsels we interviewed noted
various costs of such adoption, including costs associated with
setting up and maintaining separate committees of the board. In the
presence of these costs, it is questionable whether the benefits are so
substantial for all S&P 1500 companies that they outweigh the costs.
Second, to examine how “voluntary” the compliance by listed
issuers is, we can compare with a subset of companies that are not
subject to the stock exchanges’ corporate governance requirements:
controlled companies. Under both NYSE and Nasdaq rules,
“controlled companies” are exempted from certain corporate
governance requirements.124 More specifically, while controlled
companies are required to have an audit committee comprised of
independent directors, they are not obligated to have a majority
independent board, a compensation committee, or a nominating
committee.125 If the compliance by listed issuers is indeed truly
124. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 (“Controlled Companies. A listed
company of which more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by
an individual, a group or another company is not required to comply with the requirements
of Sections 303A.01, 303A.04 or 303A.05.”); Nasdaq Rule § 5615(c)(1) (“A Controlled
Company is a Company of which more than 50% of the voting power for the election of
directors is held by an individual, a group or another company.”).
125. See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 (exempting controlled companies
from Section 303A.01 (majority independent director requirement), Section 303A.04
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voluntary and is entirely motivated by the companies’ desire to
adopt best practices in corporate governance, we would expect that
controlled companies, in the absence of any limiting requirements,
to comply with the rules rigorously as well.
To test this hypothesis, we hand-collected board and committee
composition data of all controlled companies listed on the NYSE
and Nasdaq. As shown below in Table 3, among 232 controlled
companies examined, 88 (38%) lacked a majority independent
board, 96 (41%) lacked a fully independent compensation
committee, and 152 (66%) lacked a fully independent nominating
committee. Taken together, more than 70% of controlled companies
took advantage of at least one exemption from the corporate
governance requirements (i.e., a majority independent board, a
compensation committee comprised entirely of independent
directors, and a nominating committee comprised entirely of
independent directors). This divergence of compliance between
companies that are subject to the corporate governance
requirements and those that are not, confirms our view that the
“voluntary adoption” hypothesis explains some, but not all, of the
rigorous compliance with stock exchange corporate governance
requirements by listed companies.
TABLE 3: CONTROLLED COMPANIES’ BOARD COMPOSITION
Characteristic
Lacking Majority Independent Board
Lacking Independent Compensation
Committee
Lacking Independent Nominating
Committee
Lacking At Least One Feature Above

Number of
Companies
88

Percentage
of Total
38%

96

41%

152

66%

164

71%

Furthermore, while stock exchange rules require a controller
with more than 50% of voting control for the controlled company

(nominating and corporate governance committee), and 303A.05 (compensation committee));
Nasdaq Rule § 5615(c)(2) (exempting controlled companies from Rule 5605(b) (majority
independent director requirement), Rule 5605(d) (compensation committee), and Rule 5605(e)
(independent director oversight of director nominations)).
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exemption, in practice, companies can also be controlled by
shareholders with less than 50% of the voting power.126 They are
both in effect controlled companies that share similar internal
dynamics, but their compliance rates vary significantly depending
on whether companies are subject to the exemption based on the
50% threshold. Thus, the lower compliance rate of controlled
companies shown in Table 3 cannot solely be explained by the
unique dynamic in companies with controlled shareholders.
III. RELATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: STOCK EXCHANGE RULE AS A
RELATIONAL CONTRACT
In Part II, we illustrated the current status of enforcement and
compliance of stock exchange rules: despite lax enforcement, listed
companies rigorously comply with the stock exchange rules. While
one may argue that the low frequency of enforcement is due to a
high level of compliance, we also note that enforcement actions
infrequently move beyond noncompliance notification to the
delisting stage. Given this quantitatively and qualitatively low level
of enforcement, we would generally expect noncompliance to be
common, but we actually find the opposite. In addition, in Section
II.C, we showed that while there are a number of alternative
explanations for robust compliance by listed companies, these,
standing alone, do not sufficiently explain the level of compliance
that we observe. Hence, in this Part III, we introduce a new
perspective that can explain the dynamic between a listed company
and a stock exchange: stock exchange rule as a relational contract.
A. Conceptualizing Stock Exchange Rule as a Relational Contract
1. Relational contract
Transactions between multiple parties—and the contracts
that govern such transactions—can be characterized along a
spectrum. At one end of this spectrum lies a discrete, one-shot

126. See generally Ann M. Lipton, After Corwin: Down the Controlling Shareholder Rabbit
Hole, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1977 (2019); Note, Controller Confusion: Realigning Controlling
Stockholders and Controlled Boards, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1707 (2020) (“[I]n recent years, a
proliferation of Delaware cases has muddled the inquiry, de-emphasizing substantiality of
share ownership and holding that stockholders with as little as 15% ownership and no effective
voting power are controlling stockholders despite the presence of a controlled board.”).
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transaction. Such transactions are typically (although not always)
short-term exchanges, and the identity of the counterparty is, more
or less, irrelevant.127 A contract governing such a discrete, one-shot
transaction tends to be more complete, in that the contract
contemplates most, if not all, possible contingencies and the
consequences of each contingency.128 As such, any nonperformance
is dealt with in accordance with the “four corners” of the contract
and through legal sanctions, such as contract law-based
remedies.129 Buying a commoditized good in a foreign land would
qualify as such a discrete, one-shot transaction; since the good is
commoditized and there is no prospect of a repeat transaction, the
identity of the counterparty does not matter, and the remedy for
any nonperformance is predictable.130
At the other end of this spectrum lies an extended, long-term
relationship governed by a relational contract. Long-term
relationships that require cooperation and resource pooling
between the parties fall closer to this end of the spectrum. Because
the parties must maintain their relationship over an extended
period of time and their fates are interconnected, the identity of the
counterparty carries significant weight. In many of these
relationships, the parties make investments that are specific to the
relationship, further cementing their interconnectedness.131 Partly
because of the extended duration and complexity of the
relationship, it is impossible to state well-defined performance
obligations and delineate in advance every possible contingent
outcome, so there is uncertainty and (explicit and implicit)
127. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 856 (1978); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981);
Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 764
(1998); Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 152
(2005); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236 (1979).
128. See Macneil, supra note 127, at 859; Gudel, supra note 127, at 764; Goetz & Scott,
supra note 127, at 1092.
129. The focus on the “four corners” in contract interpretation is one of the ways in
which traditional contract law is more aligned with the discrete transaction model. Macneil,
supra note 127, at 864.
130. Scholars note that a genuinely discrete transaction is exceedingly rare. Macneil,
supra note 127, at 856; Gudel, supra note 127, at 764.
131. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 823, 830 (2000).
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discretion regarding the future of the relationship.132 A long-term
joint venture between two commercial entities, in which both
parties invest substantial resources, would be an example of such a
relational contract. As a corollary to this unpredictability and
discretion, parties to a relational contract often rely on nonlegal
sanctions (including the threat thereof) to control opportunism.133
Such nonlegal sanctions can range from reputational damage to
terminating the relationship.
2. Listing agreements between stock exchanges and listed companies
To get a better sense of how this relationship works, in this
subsection, we briefly introduce the agreement entered into
between the NYSE and a listing company. After a company chooses
which stock exchange to be listed on, a company enters into a
“listing agreement” with the stock exchange. Both the NYSE and
Nasdaq have a template listing agreement, with pre-determined
terms and conditions.
Figure 1 below captures the first part of the NYSE listing
agreement. As the figure shows, items 1 and 2 of the agreement
stipulate that a listed company has an obligation to comply with
and notify the NYSE of any noncompliance with stock exchange
rules. The agreement itself does not expressly stipulate the rules
that a listed company has to comply with, and the rules are subject
to the NYSE’s subsequent, unilateral modification. To make it even
more interesting, the agreement is silent on the NYSE’s contractual
obligations to the listing companies or potential sanctions, nor is
there an explicit duration.

132. Goetz & Scott, supra note 127, at 1091; Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 847 (2000).
133. See, e.g., Keith A. Palzer, Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 727, 730 (1988); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms:
Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out
of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992); Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV.
559, 566 (2015); Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. REV. 376, 413–14 (2018).
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FIGURE 1: NYSE LISTING AGREEMENT TEMPLATE

Since there is no express duration of the agreement, the contract
can be deemed an “at-will” contract, at least from the listed
company’s perspective. At the same time, the agreement grants
substantial latitude to the NYSE to terminate the relationship if it
deems appropriate. Item 11 of the listing agreement expressly states
that the exchange “may . . . suspend [a listed company’s] securities
and commence delisting proceedings with or without prior
notice . . . upon failure . . . to comply with any one or more sections
of the listing agreement . . . .”134 Thus, express and implied
contractual obligations and sanctions between a stock exchange
and a listed company could be summarized as in Table 4.

134. Listing Agreement for Domestic Company Equity Securities, NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/Domestic_Co_Listing_Agreement.pdf.
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TABLE 4: EXPRESS AND IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS
ON LISTING AGREEMENTS

Obligations

Sanctions

Listed Companies
Compliance with the
stock exchange rules
Payment of fees
Unilateral termination
of relationship without
penalty

Stock Exchanges
Provide a high-quality
trading platform
“Licensing” the exchange’s
reputational capital
Termination of relationship
Reputational sanction (e.g.,
public reprimand)

3. Listing agreements as relational contracts
Given the spectrum of contracts introduced in prior sections,
when we examine stock exchanges’ regulation of their listed
companies and view it from the perspective of a contract (as
opposed to top-down regulation), we see that it resembles a
relational contract rather than a one-shot exchange relying on a
complete contract. First, upon an issuer’s listing, the two parties—
the exchange and the listed company—begin an extended,
interconnected relationship that is expected to last indefinitely. As
part of that relationship, they make certain relationship-specific
investments. For instance, the exchange shares its reputational
capital with the listed company, and the listed company incurs the
initial cost of establishing a relationship with the exchange.135
Relationship-specific investments could also include compliance
with specific rules of the exchange or establishment of a cooperative
relationship with the exchange staff assigned to each listed
company. In the process of making such investments, they become
interdependent on one another. Since the continued existence and
productivity of the relationship depends on the counterparty’s
behavior, the identity of the counterparty is certainly a relevant
factor to each party.
As a corollary to this extended relationship, the listed issuer and
the exchange engage in a repeated game, in which one party’s
135. For example, after the initial listing—and the listed company incurs such initial
costs—listing of additional securities becomes much less burdensome, as the amount of
paperwork is reduced considerably.
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action affects the other party’s choices in the next period and
beyond. In a one-period game, if one party engages in opportunistic
behavior, the other party does not have ex post means of retaliation,
since the game has already ended. In this repeated game, however,
the other party that was the victim of opportunism can retaliate to
punish the opportunistic player. In the relationship between a
listed issuer and an exchange, if the listed issuer engages in
opportunism (e.g., by engaging in unscrupulous behavior while
riding on the coattails of the exchange), the exchange can act to cut
off the listed issuer from taking advantage of the exchange’s
resources; thus, the listed issuer’s past bad behavior results in the
exchange’s retaliation in future periods. On the other hand, if the
exchange fails to uphold its end of the bargain (e.g., by failing to
ensure liquid trading), the listed issuer can “retaliate” by, for
example, terminating its relationship. As we will examine, this
repeated game nature of the issuer-exchange relationship
fundamentally enables the exchange’s regulation of its issuers.
Second, their contract is an incomplete one, and much
discretion is reserved. The extended relationship between the stock
exchange and the listed company can evolve in a number of ways,
depending on the factors internal and external to the relationship.
For example, as a result of changes in the capital market conditions
or the listed company’s financial condition, listing may no longer
be an attractive option for the issuer, and the issuer reserves the
right to withdraw from listing. On the other hand, should the listed
company’s financial condition or regulatory compliance
deteriorate, the exchange also reserves discretion in the manner in
which it deals with the listed company.136 Even if an issuer’s
conduct does not violate a particular rule, if the exchange views the
issuer’s continued listing as significantly detrimental, it can rely on

136. In dealing with noncompliant issuers, the exchanges’ rules provide for baseline
sanction procedures, but the exchanges have substantial discretion as well. See, e.g., NYSE
Listed Company Manual § 802.01D (“The Exchange is not limited by the criteria set forth
above. Rather, it may make an appraisal of, and determine on an individual basis,
the suitability for continued listing of an issue in the light of all pertinent facts whenever
it deems such action appropriate, even though a security meets or fails to meet any
enumerated criteria.”); Nasdaq Rule § 5810(c) (providing that the Nasdaq staff may delist a
security if it determines under its discretionary authority that continued listing raises a
public interest concern).
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the “public interest concern” standard to delist an issuer.137
Furthermore, the listing standards themselves may evolve over
time, whether due to the parties’ conduct or because of external
factors, and the parties therefore anticipate that the baseline rules
governing their relationship will evolve as well.138
Lastly, in resolving disagreements between the parties, they
rely mostly on nonlegal sanctions, rather than legal sanctions with
the involvement of third parties. Instead of fines or court orders,
the exchanges rely on informal sanctions, such as an expression of
disapproval (whether in a conversation with the listed company or
in a public reprimand letter) or the termination of the relationship.
Likewise, the listed company’s way of sanctioning the stock
exchange is “voting with its feet” and transferring its listing to
another stock exchange. The parties resolve their disputes
internally with informal sanctions, as is typically the case with
relational contracts.
Thus, a listing relationship between a stock exchange and a
listed company resembles a relational contract. Within this
framework, we see how the above-noted pattern of little formal
enforcement and rigorous compliance is rational from the
perspective of both the stock exchange and the listed company.

137. Nasdaq Rule § 5101 (“Nasdaq may use such discretion to deny initial listing,
apply additional or more stringent criteria for the initial or continued listing of particular
securities, or suspend or delist particular securities based on any event, condition, or
circumstance that exists or occurs that makes initial or continued listing of the securities on
Nasdaq inadvisable or unwarranted in the opinion of Nasdaq, even though the securities
meet all enumerated criteria for initial or continued listing on Nasdaq.”). As a comparison,
SEC also retains significant discretion in its manner of enforcement, particularly through the
Administrative Law Judge process. See, e.g., David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC,
94 TEX. L. REV. 1155 (2016).
138. The New York Stock Exchange’s listing agreement provides that the listed
company agrees to comply with “all current and future rules, listing standards, procedures
and policies of the Exchange as they may be amended from time to time.” Listing Agreement
for Domestic Company Equity Securities, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/
nyse/listing/Domestic_Co_Listing_Agreement.pdf. Historically speaking, this was not the
case in the early days of the NYSE—issuers could only be held against the agreements they
had signed—but the restrictions on exchanges’ ability to compel compliance with new rules
led to the adoption of an open-ended listing agreement. Michael, supra note 17, at 1466 n.22
(citing RICHARD J. TEWELES & EDWARD S. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET 109 (4th ed. 1982))
(“Companies could be held only to agreements that they had signed, some of which had
been entered into very many years before. If new and additional agreements were
formulated by the Exchange, old listed companies could not be compelled to comply . . . .”).
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B. Relational Enforcement of Stock Exchange Rules
When viewed from the traditional perspective of enforcement
and compliance as one-off interactions in which both the enforcer
and the enforcement target conduct cost-benefit analyses of their
actions, the mix of little formal enforcement and strict compliance
does not make sense. Under this traditional framework, when the
exchange selects a low enforcement regime—and the listed
companies know that—there is a low expected penalty for violating
a stock exchange rule, incentivizing unscrupulous issuers to play
fast and loose. Therefore, based on the conceptualization of a stock
exchange rule as a relational contract, we now seek to explain the
enforcement and compliance pattern of stock exchange rules, in
what we call “relational enforcement.”
1. Reliance on informal sanctions and infrequent delisting
The most striking feature of the stock exchange enforcement
strategy is the reliance on conversation and negotiation with issuers
to remedy violations, instead of formal enforcement actions, and
infrequent use of the delisting option. While the formal sanctions
available to exchanges are limited to delisting, the exchanges have
created a de facto graduated system of sanctions by relying more
heavily on informal negotiations and conversations to achieve their
goal of remedying noncompliance.
Exchanges’ heavy reliance on informal sanctions mirrors the
regulatory pyramid concept of Professors Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite, in which a system of graduated punishments, along
with the use of a tit-for-tat strategy, induces compliance
effectively.139 Signaling the willingness to escalate the sanction for
continued noncompliance encourages compliance at an earlier
stage, with the most severe sanction being used only sparingly.140
Thus, we see that the “relational” nature of stock exchange
regulation is central to the effective use of informal sanctions. The
ability of the stock exchange to engage in tit-for-tat escalation of
sanctions depends on the prospect of a continued relationship

139. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 52, at 40 (noting three predictive elements of a
successful cooperative regulatory regime: use of tit-for-tat strategy, hierarchical range of
sanctions, punitiveness of the most severe sanction).
140. Id. at 39.
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between the stock exchange and the listed company. Moreover, the
exchange’s discretion in selecting the most appropriate sanction for
noncompliance means that tit-for-tat escalation (or de-escalation, as
the case may be) is a real possibility; in a case where the exchange
is limited in its course of action—for example, because the rules
prescribe certain automatic courses of action for certain
violations—the exchange’s relationship with the listed company
begins to resemble that of a one-period game, particularly because
the exchange’s response depends solely on the current period
violation and not on past period conduct of the listed company.
Additionally, the relational enforcement of stock exchange
regulation is notable in that the most severe sanction available,
delisting, severs the tie between the exchange and the listed
company. As such, the exchange is free to engage in tit-for-tat deescalation in its regulatory pyramid, but only until it imposes the
delisting sanction; once it imposes the delisting sanction, the
decision is practically irreversible. From the perspective of costbenefit analysis, while the future benefits of the relationship are
maintained as the exchange’s sanctions escalate, it is cut off when
the exchange imposes delisting sanction. Therefore, the marginal
cost of imposing the delisting sanction is substantial, foreclosing it
as a realistic option for minor violations.
2. Rigorous compliance and voluntary reporting of violations
Another striking feature of stock exchange rule enforcement
and compliance is the listed companies’ rigorous compliance and
voluntary reporting of violations. Particularly for corporate
governance violations, the delisting sanction is rarely, if ever,
imposed, so the repercussions for noncompliance are minor at best,
but as we noted in Part II, violations are practically nonexistent.
One possible explanation is that since noncompliance with
corporate governance violations, although rarely leading to delisting,
nonetheless must be disclosed to the public investors, the “shaming”
effect of such disclosures keeps the firms in check.141 Although not
subject to the delisting sanction, if the shareholders punish issuers for
noncompliance with stock exchange rules, perhaps by voting with
141. See, e.g., Sharon Yadin, Regulatory Shaming, 49 ENV’T. L. 407 (2019); Matthew
Johnson, Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety
and Health Laws, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 1866 (2020).
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their feet or by applying shareholder pressure, the fear of shareholder
punishment would induce compliance.
However, this explanation does not fully explain the ironic
coexistence of two phenomena: rigorous compliance and voluntary
reporting. If the listed companies remain fearful of punishment
from shareholders, rigorous compliance is indeed expected. At the
same time, since noncompliance must be publicly disclosed
regardless of whether it was self-reported to the exchange, the
optimal strategy from the listed company’s perspective is to keep
silent about noncompliance and remedy it internally. This is
particularly so if the violation arises out of the issuer’s intentional
misconduct or negligence or if the violation can be cured quickly
(i.e., before it can be discovered by others).142 If, on the other hand,
the reputational damage from the disclosure of noncompliance
with stock exchange rules is not significant, the “reputational
sanction explanation” does not explain the listed company’s
rigorous compliance with the exchange rules, as the expected
punishments from noncompliance are nonexistent.
In light of this seeming incongruence, we offer an alternative
explanation: signaling future value. In the exchange-issuer
relationship, in addition to a platform for liquid trading, the
exchange offers to the listed company its reputational capital. In
turn, the listed company offers to the exchange a commitment to
maintaining the reputational capital of the exchange and network
externality (in addition to tangible contributions, such as listing
fees).143 From the exchange’s perspective, the future value of the
relationship with the listed company is the combination of the
stream of tangible benefits, increase in market liquidity (network
externality), and the listed company’s future contribution to the
exchange’s reputational capital. Thus, the exchange’s perception
142. One such example would be an overdue realization that an independent director
does not satisfy the applicable independence standard. Not only is such a disclosure
embarrassing for the issuer, such a violation can be cured quickly. However, such failures to
satisfy applicable independence standards are routinely self-reported to the exchanges.
143. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 22 (1999); Jonathan R.
Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the
New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1009–10 (1990) (“[O]rganized
exchanges provide listing companies with: (1) liquidity, (2) monitoring of exchange trading,
(3) standard form, off-the-rack rules to reduce transactions costs, and (4) a signaling function
that serves to inform investors that the issuing companies’ stock is of high quality.”).

205

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

of the future value of the relationship depends partly on its
estimate of how much the listed company can contribute to the
exchange’s reputation.
In this framework, the issuer’s rigorous compliance and
voluntary reporting serve to signal that it is willing to continue to
contribute to the reputational capital of the exchange. In the future,
when, as a result of deteriorating financial conditions or otherwise,
the issuer falls short of the exchange’s listing standards, the issuer’s
past signal of its commitment to contribute to the reputational
capital of the exchange serves to increase the value of the
relationship to the exchange, making the exchange more likely to
take a second chance on the listed company (particularly since the
exchange retains substantial discretion in its delisting
determination). Thus, the issuer’s current compliance and
voluntary reporting are ways to establish bonds of trust with the
exchange and to signal the issuer’s commitment to maintain and
contribute to the exchange’s reputational capital, such that the
exchange sees continued value in maintaining the relationship.
3. Potential for hidden violations
It is indeed possible that this signaling may not overlap
completely with listed issuers’ actual compliance with stock
exchange rules; that is, listed issuers may comply only with those
rules whose violations are visible (signaling) but ignore the rules
whose violations are less easily detected. For example, whether a
board consists of a majority of independent directors or whether
certain board committees consist only of independent directors are
readily disclosed. However, whether a director who is ostensibly
independent is actually independent (e.g., whether there are side
transactions that render such director non-independent) is less
easily verifiable.
We acknowledge this possibility and how it may limit our
empirical analysis; by virtue of the fact that such violations are
“invisible,” we cannot verify this possibility in our empirical
analysis. But we note that our relational analysis is even more
important with the possibility of invisible violations. As these
violations are less visible—to investors, to regulators, and to third
parties—stock exchanges need the cooperation of the issuers to
detect and deter these violations. Therefore, it is in the exchanges’
interest to apply the regulatory pyramid to these invisible
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violations, incentivizing issuers to refrain from hidden
opportunism but signaling its willingness to escalate up the
regulatory pyramid rapidly and punish those issuers that engage
in duplicitous behavior.
A related explanation for listed issuers’ compliance with stock
exchange rules comes from the genesis of the corporate governance
standards themselves. As noted above, stock exchanges’ corporate
governance standards were adopted in the aftermath of the
WorldCom and Enron scandals, with pressure from the SEC.144
Companies may be more inclined to abide by the corporate
governance standards, even in the absence of stock exchange
enforcement, because they expect the SEC and the public to
monitor and punish them for violations.
This explanation, however, does not account for the longevity
of listed issuers’ strict adherence to stock exchange corporate
governance standards. It has been nearly two decades since the
stock exchange corporate governance standards were adopted, and
there have been a number of regulatory initiatives since then that
have overtaken the SEC’s and the public’s attention. Yet, the fact
that strict adherence to stock exchange corporate governance
standards remains lends credence to the idea of a more
fundamental driver behind listed issuers’ compliance patterns.
4. Distinction from the literature on self-reporting and self-policing
At first glance, our characterization of the exchange-issuer
relationship as a relational contract and application of the
framework to explain the puzzling coexistence of lax enforcement
and rigorous compliance may appear similar to the existing
administrative law literature on self-reporting and self-policing.
For example, Professors Toffel and Short found that in the context
of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement, the
regulatory agency shifts inspection resources away from
companies that self-report their violations and that self-reporting
is a reliable indicator of efforts invested in self-policing (and is
therefore correlated with better compliance). 145 In some ways,
there is indeed some overlap between our analysis and the
144. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
145. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary
Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 609 (2011).
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existing literature: that compliance and self-reporting serve as
signals, and that future regulatory response depends on such
signals.
At the same time, our analysis extends the literature in a
number of other ways. First, in our analysis, given the opt-in nature
of stock exchanges, the key driver of signaling behavior is the
possibility of severance of the relationship (i.e., delisting); in
contrast, in a traditional regulatory model, while a number of
regulatory punishments can be levied, severance of the regulatory
relationship is typically not an option. A number of factors, such as
the length of the relationship, the level of investment into that
relationship by both parties, and the presence (and possibility) of
alternative relationships, all affect the value of the relationship.
Thus, the level of benefit that the regulated entity can expect from
maintaining the relationship plays a significant role in how willing
such entity is to maintain strict compliance. Second, our analysis
introduces a number of complexities, which will be addressed
below in Section III.C, that affect the regulatory relationship
between the stock exchange and the listed companies. These
include: the dual status of the regulatory agency (which is unique
to self-regulatory organizations),146 the reputational spillover from
one regulated entity to another,147 and the effect of the regulatory
response on third parties.148 Thus, our analysis refines the existing
literature on self-reporting and self-policing by extending it to the
context of an opt-in self-regulatory organization.
C. Implications of Stock Exchange Rule as a Relational Contract
1. Dual status of stock exchanges and stimulating compliance
The conceptualization of stock exchange regulation as a
relational contract, in which the exchange weighs the future value
and cost of maintaining the relationship in determining whether to
delist a listed company, may be objectionable, particularly to critics
of self-regulation. Indeed, self-regulation has been under significant
criticism in recent years, mostly on the grounds that self-regulation

146. See infra Section III.C.1.
147. Id.
148. See infra Sections III.C.3., III.C.4.
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can be undermined by conflicts of interest and a lack of incentives.149
To its critics, self-regulation evokes the image of collusion,
forbearance, and regulatory capture. The fact that stock exchanges
are publicly traded entities, subject to profit pressures from their
own shareholders, accentuates this perception; particularly given
that delisting reduces the fee income (and profit) for the exchange, it
may be suspected that the exchanges would be reluctant to delist
listed companies. In the United States in particular, the competitive
nature of the stock exchange market—with the NYSE and Nasdaq
competing for listings—may also mean that the exchanges would
lower their enforcement standards lest the issuers transfer their
listing to the competitor exchange.
This concern for the “race to the bottom” in stock exchange
enforcement and potential conflicts of interest between profit and
regulatory motives of the exchanges assumes, however, two things:
first, that a listed company that falls short of an exchange’s listing
standards still presents positive future relational value to the
exchange; and second, that the two major exchanges in the United
States have (potentially) substantially different listing standards
such that a company that is subject to regulatory pressure from one
exchange is still welcome at another.
These assumptions are challengeable. First, in the stock
exchange context, the future value of the relationship is not
symmetric between the exchange and a listed company. As noted
above, from the exchange’s perspective, the future value of
maintaining the relationship with a listed company is the sum of
direct, tangible benefits (e.g., fees), network externalities, and
contribution to the reputational capital of the exchange. From the
listed company’s perspective, the future value of maintaining the
relationship is the sum of the reputational and liquidity benefits
from being listed on an exchange, offset by the regulatory burden
and the listing costs. Since the reputational value of stock exchange
listing is subject to the asymmetric information problem—if there
is a mix of high- and low-quality issuers in the exchange, the
investors do not know from listing alone which are high- and which
are low-quality issuers—a low-quality issuer (from a regulatory

149. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2011) (describing the hostility toward
industry self-regulation); Macey & Novogrod, supra note 6, at 975.
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perspective) contributes less to (or may even worsen) an exchange’s
reputational capital, while it benefits the most from the
contributions of other higher-quality issuers. As a result, the higher
the reputational benefit of listing to an issuer, the lower the
reputational benefit of keeping an issuer to an exchange. As such, a
lower-quality issuer may see substantial value in remaining listed,
but the desire to maintain the relationship may not be reciprocated
by the exchange.
Second, while there is a competition between exchanges in the
United States—and indeed, industry participants have noted to us
the perennial fear of the exchanges of losing a listed company to
another exchange—this competition does not target all listed
companies. Related to the first point, exchanges’ expectation of
relational benefit vis-à-vis low-quality issuers is low, so
competition for listing would be limited to higher-quality issuers.
Moreover, the exchanges’ listing standards are substantially
similar, such that lower-quality issuers cannot arbitrage the
difference between the listing standards and jump from one
exchange to another.
Thus, in the presence of reputational spillover from the
individual issuer to the exchange and vice versa, we would expect
competition for issuers, but only for high-quality issuers. This
competition is much less troubling, if at all, given that a conflict
between the profit motives of the exchange and its regulatory
mission is most problematic when exchanges lower their standards
to keep low-quality issuers.150
In this area, we note the relationship between competition and
the long-term stability of this “race to the top.” When there is a
stock exchange monopoly, there is a lower incentive to maintain the
reputational capital of the exchange to “compete” on the quality of
the issuers. After all, the only option for dissatisfied investors and
traders is to drop out of the market altogether. As competition
intensifies, however, there is a need to build a competitive edge in
the form of reputational capital. This competition can be internal
(for example, between the NYSE and Nasdaq) or external (threat of
new entrants into the stock exchange business). For example, as the

150. Mahoney, supra note 2, at 1457. (“As a provider of liquidity, an exchange competes
with other exchanges and over-the-counter markets, both to attract companies to list and to
induce investors to purchase listed securities.”).
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cost of entry into the business of providing a trading venue has
fallen as trading has become electronic, if the NYSE and Nasdaq
lose their reputational capital, that could spur new entrants into the
market for exchanges at any time.151
Accordingly, delisting a low-quality company that represents
positive revenue to the exchange but that poses longer-term
reputational risk is a tradeoff between the short-term and the
long-term; while delisting sacrifices current period revenue, it
ensures that over the long run, the exchange is able to maintain its
reputational capital.152
2. Relational sanction and severance of regulatory relationship
Another point of conflict between the regulatory mission of a
stock exchange and the relational nature of stock exchange
regulation is that upon exercise of the relational sanction (i.e.,
delisting), the regulatory relationship between the exchange and
the listed company is severed. This stands in contrast to a
traditional regulatory relationship, in which the regulator does not
“kick out” a regulated entity, or to a traditional relational contract,
in which there is no regulatory overlay. As a result, when a stock
exchange delists an issuer, the penalized issuer is free from the
compliance obligations imposed by the stock exchange.
Particularly since the relational sanction would already be
imposed on a lower-quality issuer, the cessation of oversight and
compliance obligation can be problematic. This problem mainly
arises because the exchange’s expectation of the future private
benefit of the relationship does not necessarily include its
regulatory mission. From the exchange’s perspective, the optimal
decision may be to cut loose an issuer that is detrimental to its

151. Brummer, supra note 10, at 1464 (“[T]he emergence of fast, low-cost, and
increasingly commoditized trading services has rendered the trading industry much more
contestable than at any time in the past.”).
152. However, as stock exchange competition further intensifies and there is less and
less leeway for exchanges to sacrifice their current period income, there can be a temptation
to prioritize short-term revenue over long-term reputational capital. In such a scenario,
excessive competition could mean that stock exchanges may engage in a “race to the bottom”
to maximize their short-term profits.
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reputational capital, but the public may benefit from continued
enforcement and compliance.153
One possible way to reconcile this gap is to make the “tiers” of
stock exchanges more explicit, such that within a particular
exchange, investors can treat different tiers of exchanges
differently. Currently, the New York Stock Exchange also has a
companion exchange, NYSE American, focused on small cap
companies, while Nasdaq operates three tiers, Global Select
Market, Global Market, and Capital Market. However, these tiers
are mostly used to classify firms based on size, and they are not
noted in many reporting services.154 But tiering the various
exchanges based on regulatory burden can also reduce the need to
entirely expel a listed company but at the same time maintain
regulatory control over that entity. Thus, this approach would
essentially create multiple levels of “delisting” (or “down-listing”),
each carrying some punitiveness for the issuer but only the most
severe one (delisting from the exchange altogether) leading to full
severance of the listing (and therefore regulatory) relationship.
3. Relational sanction’s impact on third parties
The presence and interests of third parties can further complicate
the relationship between an exchange and its listed companies. In
particular, the severity of the delisting sanction means that the
shareholders are the primary victims of a listed company’s
noncompliance and subsequent delisting; as expected, delisting
generally has a significant negative impact on share price and
liquidity.155 Like the divergence between the exchange’s private
incentives to preserve its reputational capital and the public’s
interests in maintaining oversight over the listed companies, there
can be a divergence between the shareholders’ interests and the
interests of the exchange and, indirectly, between the current
shareholders’ interests and the future shareholders’ interests.
As noted above, from the exchange’s perspective, delisting is
optimal if the future benefits of maintaining the relationship are

153. The OTC Market does have a set of listing standards, but they are generally laxer
than the major stock exchanges’.
154. For example, price information from Nasdaq’s own website does not show which
of the three tiers a listed company belongs to.
155. See Macey, O’Hara & Pompilio, supra note 11, at 701; see also supra Section I.B.2.
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outweighed by the reputational drain of the applicable listed
company. On the other hand, the listed company’s shareholders
have a strong preference to keep the company listed to avoid the
liquidity and value penalties of delisting. Given that the benefits of
delisting a low-quality issuer accrue to a diverse spectrum of
investors—few of whom have serious interest in the decision—
while the negative effects accrue to a small group of shareholders
of that particular issuer who have concentrated interests, the
issuer’s shareholders may exert substantial pressure on the
exchange to maintain the listing, and the shareholders’ pressures
may not be offset by the potential benefits to the public investors at
large.156 This may also have the effect of changing the reputational
calculation for the exchange, which may view delisting as more
detrimental to its reputation, even when there are signs of trouble.
Lack of a private right of action for violation of stock exchange rules
may further exacerbate the shareholders’ resistance since they may
be left without any recourse.157
Thus, given the presence of and pressures from third parties, an
exchange may be pressured to err on the side of forbearance. As
noted above, the timing of relational sanction is important because
it is both effectively irrevocable and critical to ensuring that the
number of victims of corporate malfeasance is minimized.158
In this area, the SEC’s regulatory overlay also plays an
important role. As noted in Section II.A.1, the SEC has the authority
to review stock exchanges’ delisting decisions upon appeal by the
penalized issuer under Section 19(f) of the Exchange Act. In
conducting such a review, however, the SEC’s three-prong
standard of review—whether the facts underlying the delisting
exist, whether the delisting is in accordance with the rules of the
exchange, and whether the rules of the exchange are consistent with
the purposes of the Exchange Act—means that only rarely will a
stock exchange’s delisting decision be reversed.

156. See, e.g., James Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law,
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 141–43 (2017); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities
Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 104 (2015); Donald C.
Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591 (2006).
157. See supra Section I.B.3.
158. See supra Section I.B.2.
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Furthermore, regarding the apparent conflict of interest
between current shareholders (who will be harmed by a delisting
decision) and prospective shareholders, the SEC has clearly
articulated that the interests of the prospective investors must come
first.159 Thus, the SEC is not sympathetic to the arguments of
delisted issuers that such a sanction hurts current investors.
On the other hand, while the SEC’s standard of review and
doctrine are not favorable to the current shareholders of delisted
companies, in practice, there is also a disparity between current and
future shareholders in their ability to exert pressure. A company
facing delisting—and the shareholders who stand to be hurt by
such delisting—have a number of remedies, including appeals
within the stock exchange and appeal to the SEC. On the other
hand, if a stock exchange errs on the side of forbearance, the future
investors have little recourse except public pressure, and given that
the “benefits” of delisting a noncompliant issuer accrue to a diverse
set of investors, the incentives for future investors to “fight” a stock
exchange’s forbearance decision are low as well.
Based on this statutory and practical framework, we note a
divergence between the two. While an appealing issuer is unlikely
to succeed at the SEC appeal stage, there can still be considerable
investor pressure exerted on the stock exchanges to turn a blind eye
to noncompliance with its rules. Knowing that once the delisting
decision is made it is practically irreversible, the current investors
are likely to fight the delisting decision at the stock exchange stage,
and there is little countervailing effort on the side of the future
investors. To reduce this disparity and to alleviate shareholder
pressure to maintain an issuer’s listing, we propose that a private
right of action for violations of stock exchange rules be recognized.
At the same time, to prevent such private rights of action from
ballooning to strike suits and preventing companies from
cooperating with exchanges, shareholder-plaintiffs may be entitled
to recover damages only when an exchange has taken tangible
action against an issuer, such as suspension or delisting.

159. Midland Res., Inc., 46 SEC 861, 864 (1977); Navistar Int’l Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 56769, at 14 (“[W]hile exclusion from a quotation system may hurt existing
investors, primary emphasis must be placed on the interests of prospective future investors.”).
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4. Double-edged sword of informality
A key element of the relational contract between a listed issuer
and an exchange is the informality of the relationship. As noted
above, formally speaking, the exchanges only have a limited
number of sanctions available to them: forbearance (i.e., lack of a
sanction), public reprimand, or suspension/delisting. But the
exchanges have created a de facto system of informal sanctions,
culminating in its most draconian formal sanction, delisting. This
informality pervades not only the form of the sanctions themselves
but also the processes by which and standards against which
sanctions are applied. For example, exchanges engage in informal
negotiations and conversations with listed companies to prod them
into compliance. Likewise, the level of sanction to be applied
depends heavily on the exchange’s discretion.
This informality can affect the exchange’s regulation of its
listed companies in multiple ways. First, the informality of the
exchange’s regulation of its listed companies can preserve the
intrinsic motivation of listed companies to comply with the
exchange standards and moderate the exchanges’ opposition.
A rigid, formalistic system of regulation can breed resentment
from the perspective of the regulated entities and turn what is a
moral norm into a mere regulatory requirement. 160 Such a rigid
approach can “crowd out” moral norms and turn “we should
comply because it is the right thing to do” (a cooperative
approach) into “we have no choice but to comply—and will not
comply if we do not have to” (a cat-and-mouse chase).161 In
contrast, a more textured approach from the exchange can
preserve the intrinsic incentives for listed companies to comply
with the exchange listing rules. Thus, in this sense, the informality
of the exchange’s regulatory relationship with the listed
companies can reduce regulatory costs and improve issuer
160. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation
in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 718 (1997) (“A
business’s long-term incentives might induce it to comply with agency regulations even
when there are short-term incentives to disobey, but government enforcement policies
determine whether managers will comply. If the government punishes companies in
circumstances where managers believe there has been good faith compliance, corporate
officers may react by being less cooperative with regulatory agencies.”).
161. See, e.g., Kristen Underhill, Money That Costs Too Much: Regulating Financial
Incentives, 94 IND. L.J. 1109 (2019).
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compliance by maintaining the cooperative nature of the
relationship.
On the flip side, the informality of the relationship between a
listed issuer and an exchange can lead to criticism that the
exchanges are underenforcing their listing standards. This criticism
may be accentuated for two reasons. First, the exchanges are
self-regulatory organizations, and critics may see them as more
conflicted than purely public agencies. Second, while explicit,
written rules are subject to public comment and input, informal
enforcement decisions are less transparent and therefore more
susceptible to charges of underenforcement. Moreover, the
exchanges’ graduated approach to issuer regulation may appear to
be underenforcement, even if the leniency offered to the listed
companies may be intentional. Reputational concerns, the potential
private right of action suggested in the previous subsection, and
SEC oversight can mitigate underenforcement concerns, but the
perception of underenforcement may independently erode the
public’s confidence in the exchanges, potentially undermining the
stability of the exchange’s regulatory approach.
CONCLUSION
Regulation by stock exchanges offers a mix of characteristics. In
that they impose obligations on listed companies and public
investors expect compliance with such obligations, they are akin to
other types of regulations. In that the exchanges are private,
profit-seeking entities, the regulatory and enforcement framework
also creates an incentive structure that is not identical to a
government regulator’s. As noted above, stock exchange regulation
is also subject to a number of peculiarities, including a lack of
a private right of action, limited enforcement options, and a
competitive market for listings.
With this backdrop, we find a puzzling coexistence of
enforcement that often lacks teeth and compliance that is nearly
perfect. Using the highway analogy previously presented, what we
find is a stretch of highway in which there is very little police
presence. The police do not have a well-functioning radar gun, so
they rely largely on individuals’ self-reporting of their speeding
violations. And when the police do catch an offender, the offender
is often let go with a warning. Yet, on this highway, we see very
few cars, if at all, speeding.
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To explain this curious coexistence, we apply the concept of a
relational contract to stock exchange rules. Both the exchange and
the listed company establish a long-term relationship with each
other, and discretion, particularly given the changing nature of the
stock market, is reserved for both parties. In this dynamic, issuers’
strong compliance can be considered a signal of their commitment
to preserving and increasing the exchange’s reputational capital.
The exchange’s discretion, although rarely used, in imposing a
draconian penalty further serves to deter opportunistic behavior;
if the police have the discretion to permanently revoke a driver’s
license for speeding, such discretion would significantly deter
speeding, even if such penalty is rarely, if ever, imposed. To those
concerned about conflict of interest in this relational contract, we
also present why a race to the bottom has not occurred in stock
market regulation.
In the era of sharing regulatory authority with private entities—
with decreasing emphasis on command-and-control regulation by
the government—stock exchange rules present an interesting case
study. As we saw in the case of stock exchange rules, a rigid, formal
approach is not the only answer to inducing rigorous compliance.
Even when it appears to be lax, an appropriately designed
regulatory regime can nonetheless induce strong compliance, even
without heavy intervention and sanctions.
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